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Abstract 
Professional skepticism about DID and lack ofknowledge about DID has been 
documented in the adult literature on dissociative pathology (Hayes and Mitchell, 1994). 
Although 100% of adult DID cases are thought to have originated in childhood as 
sequelae of trauma, to date no studies about professional skepticism of and knowledge 
about bID have been done with psychologists who specialize in assessing children and 
adolescents. This study was designed to investigate the beliefs about DID and knowledge 
of DID that has been garnered by psychologists who specialize in assessing and treating 
adolescents. This study consisted ofa convenience sample of 34 participants recruited 
from the American Psychological Association's Division 53 and from participants 
surveyed via the Internet. This research replicates the study done by Hayes and Mitchell 
(1994) utilizing the Skepticism and Knowledge Scale designed by them. The abysmal 
response rate of2.7% allowed for descriptive analysis but reduced power in calculating 
correlations between variables. Results indicated an inv~rse correlation between the 
Skepticism and the Knowledge variables. Unlike similar studies in the adult literature 
about dissociative pathology, participants lacked skepticism about DID and were 
knowledgeable about DID. Yet only 17.6% of the sample accurately diagnosed the DID 
vignette. The findings of this study reinforce other research findings (Putnam, 1991) that 
vi 
DID, the paradigmatic Dissociative Disorder, is seldom diagnosed in childhood and 
adolescence. The limitations of this study suggest that findings should be regarded as 
exploratory rather than conclusive as those who chose not to participate may have done so 
because of extreme skepticism as well as lack ofknowledge about DID. 
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Psychologists' Skepticism and Knowledge about Dissociative Identity Disorder in 
Adolescents 
Statement ofthe Problem 
Dissociative phenomena have been described in scientific literature for centuries 
(Ellenberger, 1970). One of the earliest descriptions of the diagnosis and treatment of a 
child with Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), formerly called Multiple Personality 
Disorder (MPD), was written in 1840 by Antoine Despine, a French physician. In the 
introduction to his monograph describing the case of Estelle, a child with DID, Despine 
notes his "fear that generations to follow would not attend to the findings of their 
predecessor's original mistakes" (Fine, 1988, p.38). Supporting Despine's fears, DID was 
considered to be a rare disorder and rarely mentioned in psychology textbooks (Putnam, 
1989). 
Misdiagnosis ofDID. Experts (Putnam, Guroff, Silberman, Barban & Post, 1986) 
on dissociative phenomena agree with Despine's fears about his predecessor's repeating 
mistakes about diagnosing DID. They reported on one hundred contemporary cases of 
adult DID's that had been misdiagnosed, having received an average 3.6 incorrect 
psychiatric or neurological diagnoses, with an average 6.8 years between assessment for 
symptoms indicative of DID and accurate diagnosis. Other experts, (Alvarado, 1989) 
reviewing psychopathology in the 19th century, reported four cases of adolescents with 
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double personality and one case of multiple personality in a child; however, Steinberg 
(1996) notes no reported cases of DID in children between 1840 and 1979. Perhaps this 
discrepancy in reported numbers of cases of DID in children and adolescents is related to 
DID experts' experiences that scientific committees andjoumal reviewers are reluctant to 
present topics relevant to diagnosing DID in children and adolescents (Kluft, 1990). The 
inability of clinicians to find a scientific format to discuss information about DID is a 
formidable obstacle in establishing a basis to obtain scientific knowledge about DID. 
Diagnostic obstacles. Other obstacles to diagnosing DID accurately in both adults 
and children are the seemingly baffling symptom complex: signs of DID can frequently 
be confused with other psychiatric diagnoses; the polymorphous symptom presentation or 
the presence of a coexisting disorder frequently makes the diagnosis of other psychiatric 
disorders the norm (Kluft, 1986; Lewis, 1996; Steinberg, ] 996). The oiagnosis of DID in 
children and adolescents is further complicated by a variety of factors: the need to 
differentiate between normal childhood fantasy involving imaginary companions and the 
alter personality states inherent in DID; the differentiation between normal childhood 
dissociation and pathological dissociation; the consideration of the less fixed 
symptomotology in children; the identification of childhood trauma and responses to the 
trauma; and the realization that abused children often move from one geographic place to 
another geographic place, thus, a complete data base of the child's history may be 
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lacking; in addition, abused children are likely to present denying problems (Lewis, 1996; 
Putnam, 1991; Steinberg, 1996). 
Despite the knowledge that 100% of DID begins in childhood (Steinberg, 1996), 
as an adaptive dissociative response to childhood trauma (K1uft & Fine, 1989), the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder 4th editions {DSM-IV American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) does not include a category for childhood dissociative 
disorders (Peterson, 1996) which may also be a factor for the low index of suspicion of 
DID in children (Peterson, 196; Putnam, 1997; Steinberg, 1996). Nevertheless, there is a 
growing interest in childhood dissociative disorders as an outgrowth of clinical 
knowledge about adult dissociative disorders accumulated over the past two decades 
(Hornstein & Tyson, 1991). Fewer than 3% ofDID patients are diagnosed under 12 years 
of age, while fewer than 8% are diagnosed in adolescence between the ages of 12 years 
of age and 19 years of age (Steinberg, 1996). 
Low index ofdiagnostic suspicion factors. The recognition of childhood DID lags 
behind the recognition of adult DID (Putnam, 1991). Speculations concerning the lag in 
recognizing DID in children are due to a number of factors: the high level of professional 
skepticism about DID in the child psychiatric community (Putnam, 1991); the smaller 
numbers of clinicians and reseatchers in the child psychiatric community (Ross, 1996); 
the nature of the disorder per se and its precluding detection; the lack of typical or 
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baseline psychological profiles on clinical observation on psychological testing in 
children with DID; the natural history of DID; and the child's fear of ridicule or disbelief 
by others (McElroy, 1992). Causes for inaccurate diagnoses may be based on the 
clinician's disbelief that the child may be assuming a defensive posture against 
overwhelming trauma (Goodwin, 1985), or the clinician's wish to minimize pathology in 
order to rescue the child from receiving a controversial diagnosis such as DID (McElroy 
& McElroy, 1991). 
Skepticism about DID. Similar to adult samples, the recognition and acceptance of 
DID in children is controversial. This controversy contributes to the limited information 
available on diagnosing DID in childhood and adolescents. No other mental illness elicits 
from clinicians such strong denials of the possibility of its existence. Surprisingly, 
clinicians who usually demonstrate an intense curiosity about other clinical phenomenon 
demonstrate an intense lack of interest in dissociative pathology (Hicks, 1985). 
Researchers have explored skepticism about DID with professionals diagnosing 
and treating adult popUlations (Dell, 1988; Dunn, Paolo, Ryan &Van Fleet, 1994; Hayes 
& Mitchell, 1994). Dell's (1988) study surveyed 62 therapists who treated adults with 
DID. The findings affirmed the following: (a) the existence ofprofessional skepticism; 
(b) disbelief in DID and under sensitivity to dissociative phenomenon among 
professionals not treating DID and; (c) dissociative diagnoses going unrecognized by 
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clinicians. Dunn, et al. (1994) surveyed therapists in the Veterans Administration Medical 
Center about their beliefs in DID. Findings indicated that while 80% of participants 
believed in DID, only 31% of the total sample completed the survey. Although this 
response rate is very much in line with statistical response rates for research surveys, 
Dunn, et al. (1994) further speculated that those who did not respond to the survey may 
be more skeptical of DID than those who did respond to it. Hayes and Mitchell (1994) 
surveyed a total of 115 mental health professionals (psychology, psychiatry, and social 
work) to study the nature of mental health professionals' skepticism about DID. There 
were greater amounts of skepticism associated with less knowledge about DID. 
Professionals who were not skeptical of DID and were knowledgeable about DID were 
younger (M = 45.95) than prdfessionals (M = 49.08) who were skeptical about DID and 
had less knowledgeable about DID (Dunn, et aI., 1994), Perhaps this reflects the fact that 
until the publication ofthe Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM)-III in 1980, 
Multiple Personality was categorized under hysteria rather than as a specific diagnostic 
entity. 
Importance ofaccurate, early diagnosis. Experts in the field of dissociation 
identify reasons for the importance of recognizing DID in children (Hornstein & Tyson, 
1991; Kluft, 1990; Putnam, 1997). Since DID is sequelae of childhood abuse, the early 
diagnosis and intervention with the child and family may prevent continuation of the 
6 Skepticism, DID, Adolescents 
abuse. Unlike their adult counterparts who may spend years in therapy, dissociative 
pathology in children and adolescents responds more rapidly to therapeutic intervention, 
which has an economic impact from both a fiscal and humanitarian perspective. While 
one can only speculate that the low index of suspicion for DID in childhood is related to a 
lack of knowledge about dissociative pathology across chronological developmental 
spans (pre-school, school age, adolescence) (Putnam, 1997), all research findings with 
adult populations (Dell, 1988; Dunn, et ai., 1994; Hayes & Mitchell, 1994) concur that 
there is an inverse relationship between knowledge about DID and professional 
skepticism about DID among professionals. The less knowledge a participant had about 
DID, the more skeptical the participant was about DID. 
One can hope that Putnam's desire (1997) that the knowledge about DID learned· 
from diagnosing and treating adults will contribute to the knowledge base, rather than 
fuel old debates, about recognizing and treating DID in children and adolescents. Yet, 
clinical anecdotes and professional experiences in diagnosing DID in children indicate 
otherwise (Kluft, 1990; Peterson, 1997; Putnam, 1997). There are no studies to date on 
the nature of professional skepticism about DID within either the child or the adolescent 
psychology community. Thus, the problem statement is to investigate and to describe the 
presence or absence ofprofessional skepticism about DID and about the nature of the 
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skepticism about DID among psychologists who diagnose and treat children and 
adolescents. 
Purpose ofthe Study 
Dissociative experts (Braun, 1988; Klufi, 1984; Peterson, 1996; Putnam, 1997) 
concur that DID in adults is the sequelae of childhood abuse that originated prior to six 
years of age. Developmental experts (Macfie, Cicchetti, & Toth, 2001) found that 
maltreated and nonmaltreated preschool-aged children followed different trajectories for 
dissociation: physically and sexually abused children demonstrated more dissociation 
than nonmaltreated children did. Yet, it is unusual for DID, the paradigmatic DD to be 
diagnosed in childhood and adolescents (Putnam, 1991). Speculations in the dissociative 
literature (Putnam, 1991) and anecdotal reports from psychologists who treat traumatized 
children and aqol~s~ents indl~ate skepticism about DID as well as a dearth of knowledge 
about the diagnosis of DID in childhood which may be correlated with the low 
percentages of accurate diagnosis pf DID prior to adulthood (Steinberg, 1996). There are 
published studies (Dell, 1988; Dunn et ai., 1994; Hayes & Mitchell, 1994) which find that 
professional skepticism about DID and a lack of knowledge about DID among 
professionals treating adults that impacts on diagnosis and treatment. However, there has 
not been any published study which queries psychologists treating children and 
adolescents about their beliefs about DID and knowledge about DID, the paradigmatic 
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DD. The purpose of this study is to investigate the absence or presence ofprofessional 
skepticism about DID and to describe the nature of the professional skepticism about 
DID via measuring beliefs about DID that psychologists have who specialize in 
diagnosing and treating children and adolescents. The potential benefits of this study are: 
1.) Ascertain descriptions of the beliefs about the diagnosis of DID among 
psychologists who treat children and adolescents. 
2.) Ascertain the level of knowledge about DID that psychologists have who treat 
children and adolescents. 
3.) Increase understanding within the field of psychology ofthe impact that 
professional beliefs about DID and knowledge about DID have on the 
accurate diagnosis of DID in adolescence. 
4.) Develop an empirical basis for the speculations and the anecdotal reports of 
psychologists who express skepticism and lack of knowledge about DID in 
children and adolescents. 
5.) Add to the knowledge base on diagnosis of dissociative pathology, within the 
child and the adolescent psychology community, contributing infonnation 
relevant to early, accurate diagnosis of DID. 
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Rationale and Theoretical Background for the Study 
Systems theory description. Systems theory is often used to understand underlying 
dynamics and processes of families. However, systems theory principles are also 
applicable to understanding the dynamics and processes in other groups of individuals 
such as psychologists. Wilson and Kneisl (1979) describe systems theory as: 
A system is defined as an identifiable set of components characterized by a 
boundary, with interactions and interrelationships among the components. 
Anything that affects one part of the system affects every other part and the 
system as a whole. The combined interrelationships constitute a meaningful 
whole, and the system is greater than the sum of its parts (p. 827). 
For this study, the identified system is the field of psychology; the components 
are identified as psychologists. Within this system, psychologists are divided into two 
subsystems: proponents ofDID and skeptics of DID. These subsystems, proponents of 
DID and skeptics of DID, have an ongoing interaction and relationship with one another. 
As with any subsystem, the exchange of information between and among these 
subsystems is a dynamic process that is operationalized in professional publications and 
professional conferences on topics such as the etiology of dissociative pathology and the 
nature of memory relevant to the argument about the validity of the diagnosis of DID. 
Boundaries, wholeness, homeostasis, and open or closed traits characterize all systems 
and subsystems. Descriptions of systems' characteristics and selected illustrations of each 
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characteristic as applicable to the subsystems of DID proponents and DID skeptics is 
presented, using current and historical material. 
Systems J theory principles. Boundaries describe who is in a particular system, 
their participation within the system, the degree of differentiation the system allows, their 
degree of investment within the system, as well as who and what is allowed outside of the 
system (Minuchin, 1974; Stuart & Sundeen, 1983). Boundaries may be rigid, enmeshed, 
diffuse, clear or conflictual. Conflictual boundaries are demonstrated between proponents 
of DID and skeptics of DID in their opposing views related to the etiology of DID. 
Proponents ofDID (Kluft, 1984; Putnam, 1991) espouse a trauma based model of 
etiology for DID, but skeptics of DID (Spanos, 1994) espouse a sociocognitive model of 
etiology for DID. Thus, these etiological models present divergent beliefs about DID: 
proponents of DID believe that DID is sequelae of childhood trauma as opposed to 
skeptics ofDID who believe that DID is a culture bound phenomena. 
Wholeness is a vital aspect of systems theory. Wholeness means that components 
within the system of psychology are interdependent. Thus, a change or movement in any 
component of the system affects all other components of the system (Minuchin, 1974). 
Freud's views about hysteria, confided in a letter to Fleiss in 1897, influenced a 
movement away from the concept of dissociation to the concept of repression 
(Ellenberger, 1970), setting the historical precedent for the current debate about 
Skepticism, DID, Adolescents 11 
dissociation versus repression that is part of the controversy about DID. Freud confided 
his reasons for abandoning the Theory of Hysteria: difficulties distinguishing 
unconscious memory from fiction; the large numbers of unnoticed father-daughter incest 
events seemed improbable; and the lack of therapeutic success (Ellenberger, 1970). Both 
proponents of DID (Gleaves & Freyd, 1997) and skeptics of DID (Lilienfeld, Lynn, 
Kirsch, Chaves, Sarbin, Ganaway, & Powell,1999) continue to argue about these same 
issues: dissociation versus repression, the impact of trauma on memory, the veracity of 
accusations of abuse, and treatment outcomes for patients with DID. 
Another systems theory principle espouses the idea that systems strive to achieve 
dynamic equilibrium or balance, a homeostasis. Homeostasis may be constructive or 
destructive. Unless a system can achieve a constructive balance within a range of 
functioning, objectives and tasks of the system cannot be accomplished (Wilson & 
Kneisl, 1979). In an effort to achieve a constructive balance between proponents of DID 
and skeptics of DID, Knapp (2000) reviews statements and position papers from 
professional associations on both sides of the recovered memory debate that add fuel to 
professional skepticism about DID. He acknowledges that there is professional consensus 
about child abuse, the nature of memory, and the standards for diagnosis of adults who 
have lost memories of abuse; there continues to be controversy about the nature and 
accuracy of memory. 
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Components in one system may also be components of another system. For 
example, psychologists are also components of: the health care system, professional 
organizations, and societal associations. Organizations such as the International Society 
for the Study of Dissociation (ISSD) and the International Society for Traumatic Stress 
Studies) (ISTSS) tend to attract members who are proponents of DID; organizations such 
as the False Memory Syndrome Foundation (FMSF) tend to attract members who are 
skeptical of DID. The American Psychological Association (APA) has both proponents 
of DID and skeptics ofDID in their membership, which may account for the 
organization's intentional decision to exclude terms such as "repressed memories", 
"recovered memories", "false memories", and "implanted memories" from the report of 
the Working Group on Investigation of Memories of Childhood Abuse. These terms are 
viewed by the Working Group members as having an emotional impact that makes 
rational scientific discussion improbable (AP A, ] 996). 
A system may be open or closed. Open systems must have flexibility to adapt to 
the environment, but closed systems do not permit exchange of information between the 
system and the environment (Minuchin, 1974; Stuart & Sundeen, 1983). Peterson (1996) 
reviews his efforts to influence the DSM-IV Task Force to consider establishing a 
dissociative disorder for children, and to consider, further, his efforts with The Disorders 
Usually First Diagnosed During Infancy, Childhood and Adolescence Work Group to 
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include dissociative disorder in the differential diagnosis for other disorders commonly 
diagnosed in childhood and adolescence. Although these suggestions were not taken by 
the Task Force or the Work Group, other suggestions were taken: to identify children in 
the DID criteria; and to recognize dissociative disorder in the rule-out criterion for 
ADHD (Peterson, 1996). Hence, the system of psychology is open to adapting to 
information that is exchanged among professionals despite the controversy between 
proponents ofDID who advocate for establishing a dissociative disorder for children in 
the DSM and skeptics of DID who advocate for eliminating dissociative disorder 
categories for children and adults in the DSM. 
Review ofRelevant Literature 
Definitions ofdissociation. Dissociation is defined in the DSM-IV TR (APA, 
2000) as a defense mechanism with sudden, gradual, transient, or chronic disruption in 
the "usually integrated functions of ~o~yioH~ness, rn~Il1ory, identity, or perception of the 
environment" (p. 822). Automatic psychological defense mechanisms serve to protect 
individuals against anxiety and "from the awareness of internal or external dangers or 
stressors " (p. 807). Dissociation is conceptually viewed on the Defensive Functioning 
Scale in the DSM-IV TR as a mental inhibition, or compromise level defense, protecting 
the individual by keeping "potentially threatening ideas, feelings, memories, wishes, or 
fears out of awareness" (p. 808). 
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Functions ofdissociation. Dissociation is a defense mechanism that exists on a 
continuum ranging from normal states such as daydreaming to pathological states such as 
DID (Braun, 1988). Normative dissociation in adulthood involves daydreaming as well as 
highway hypnosis; normative dissociation in childhood involves fantasy play and the 
creation of imaginary companions (Fein, 1981; Putnam, 1995). Ross (1997) 
conceptualizes normal dissociation versus pathological dissociation across psychosocial 
and biological quadrants. The quadrants are: normal psychosocial; normal biological; 
abnonnal psychosocial; and abnormal biological. While Ross (1997) considers being 
absorbed in a book or movie forms of normal psychosocial dissociation, he considers 
forgetting to use the bathroom during the night a form of biological dissociation. Ross 
(1997) illustrates the use of abnormal psychosocial dissociation as amnesia following 
incest or physical abuse, but amnesia as a consequence of a head injury as illustrative of 
biological dissociation in both adults and children. 
Experts (Ross, 1997; van der Kolk, 1987) in the field of dissociation view 
dissociation as a means of organizing information, as a process that produces alterations 
in an individual's feelings, thoughts, or actions, and as a way of compartmentalizing 
one's experience. In addition to serving as a defense against stress and overwhelming 
trauma, Ludwig (1983) describes other values and functions of dissociation: 
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Dissociation represents the fundamental psychobiological mechanism underlying 
a wide variety of altered forms of consciousness, including conversion hysteria, 
hypnotic trance, mediumistic trance, multiple personality, fugue states, spirit 
possession and highway hypnosis. This mechanism has great individual and 
species survival value. Under certain conditions, it serves to facilitate seven major 
functions: (1) the automatization of certain behaviors, (2) the efficiency and 
economy of effort, (3) the resolution of irreconcilable conflicts, (4)escape from 
the constraints of reality, (5) the isolation of catastrophic experiences, (6) the 
cathartic discharge of certain feelings, and (7) the enhancement of herd sense (e.g. 
the submersion of the individual ego for the group identity, greater suggestibility, 
etc.) (p. 93). 
Maldonado and Spiegel (1994) describe the utility of dissociation for individuals faced 
with overwhelming trauma: 
Dissociative states can be viewed as efforts to preserve some form of 
control, comfort, safety, and identity when faced with overwhelming stress. 
They give the victim a false sense of control and relief from the experience, so 
that it is as ifthe event is not happening and, later, as if it had never happened 
(p.228). 
Experts (Klufi, 1985; Peterson, 1997; Putnam, 1989; Ross, 1997; van der Kolk, 
1987) in the field' of trauma and dissociation concur that dissociative states are common 
and normative experiences in both adulthood and childhood; these experts also concur 
that dissociation which is used to adapt to trauma that occurs over time can be reinforced, 
evolving into a maladaptive defensive functioning. Putnam (1989) notes that "disruption 
of normal integrative functions has been the critical issue of definitions of dissociation" 
(p. 6). Lowenstein (1991) views DID as a "complex form of posttraumatic dissociative 
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developmental disorder primarily related to severe, repetitive childhood abuse or trauma 
usually beginning before the age of five" (p. 721). This functioning provides the 
traumatized child with a psychological escape from overwhelming trauma. Nemiah 
(1981) notes that pathological dissociation involves experience in identity alteration; it 
also involves experience in memory disturbance for events that occur during a 
dissociative episode. Nemiah's (1981) views about identity alteration and memory 
disturbance are among the characteristics cited in the forms of Dissociative Disorders 
(DD) described in the DSM-IV TR. 
Features ofdissociation in DSM-JV-TR. Ellenberger (1970) and Goettman, 
Greaves, and Coons (1994) have reviewed the two hundred-year history of dissociative 
pathology documented in the French, German, and English psychological literature. 
However, it was not until the DSM-III (AP A, 1980) publication that the United States 
psychiatric community crystallized dissociative disorders as a psychiatric diagnostic 
category. The DSM IV -TR notes that the essential feature of the Dissociative Disorders 
(DD) is a "disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, 
identity, or perception" (p.519). The five forms of DD cited in the DSM·IV-TR are: 1) 
Dissociative Amnesia (formerly called Psychogenic Amnesia); 2) Dissociative Fugue 
(formerly called Psychogenic Fugue); 3) Depersonalization Disorder; 4) Dissociative 
Identity Disorder (DID) (formerly called Multiple Personality Disorder); and 5) 
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Dissociative Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (DDNOS) (fonnerly called Multiple 
Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified). 
Forms ofdissociative pathology. Dissociative amnesia is characterized in the 
DSM-IV -TR as "an inability to recall important personal infonnation, usually of a 
traumatic or stressful nature, that is too extensive to be explained by ordinary 
forgetfulness" (p. 519). Dissociative fugue is characterized in the DSM-IV -TR as 
"sudden, unexpected travel away from home or one's customary place of work, 
accompanied by an inability to recall one's past and confusions about personal identity or 
assumption of a new identity" (p.519). Coons (1998) notes that dissociative fugue is 
dissociative amnesia plus travel. Depersonalization disorder is characterized in the DSM­
IV-TR by "a persistent or recurrent feeling of being detached from one's mental 
processes or body that is accompanied by intact reality testing" (p.5l9). Coons (1998) 
notes that transient depersonalization symptoms can be present in the other dissociative 
disorders, dissociative amnesia, DDNOS, and DID. The diagnosis of depersonalization 
disorder cannot be made if the depersonalization occurs as part of any other psychiatric 
disorder such as panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, or schizophrenia (Coons, 
1998). DID is characterized in the DSM-IV-TR by "the presence of two or more distinct 
identities or personality states that recurrently take control of the individual's behavior 
accompanied by an inability to recall important personal infonnation that is too extensive 
Skepticism, DID, Adolescents 18 
to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness" (p. 519). Coons (1998) notes that DID 
includes the amnesia, the fugue, and the depersonalization characteristics specified in the 
other dissociative disorders. Perhaps this is the underlying reason that DID is considered 
to be the paradigmatic DD, because if a therapist can diagnose DID then the therapist can 
diagnose any of the less complex dissociative states (Fine & Madden, 2000). DDNOS is 
described in the DSM-IV-TR as useful for "coding disorders in which the predominant 
feature is a dissociative symptom, but that do not meet the criteria for any specific 
Dissociative Disorder" (p. 519). 
Development ofDiagnostic Criteria for DID. With the publication of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Third Edition (DSM-III), Multiple Personality (MP) 
became a distinct disorder separate from the prior category ofHysterical Neurosis, 
Dissociative Type (American Psychiatric Association, 1980; Peterson 1996; Putnam, 
1994). The change in nomenclature has been attributed to clinicians who were beginning 
to recognize that trauma was associated with psychological as well as physiological 
sequelae, largely as an outcome of the Viet Nam war and the Feminist movement (van 
der Kolk, 1987). With the advent of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Third Edition 
Revised (DSM-III-R), the nomenclature was again changed to Multiple Personality 
Disorder (MPD) (American Psychiatric Association, 1984). The content ofthe DSM-III­
R changed the diagnostic criteria for MPD, with the inclusion of amnesia as well as the 
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need for the clinician to rule out substance, medical, and developmental disturbances 
(Peterson, 1996). 
With the advent of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Fourth Edition (DSM­
IV), MPD nomenclature was again changed to Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), 
reflecting the Task Forces' efforts to convey the concept of a proliferation of identities 
rather than a proliferation of personalities (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
The DSM-III cited that the onset ofMP occurs in early childhood or later, rarely 
being diagnosed until adolescence. However, it was not until the DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) that Criterion D cautioned that symptoms in childrel1 
could not be better attributed to imaginary companions or fantasy, and that DID was 
included as a differential diagnosis and rule-out criterion for Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) (Peterson, 1996). The DSM-IV Task Force was 
concerned that DID would be over diagnosed, electing not to include dissociative 
disorders as a differential diagnosis in other diagnostic categories (Weiner, England, 
Frances, First, Wise, Holland, & Williams, 1995). 
DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria/or DID. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
Fourth Edition Text Revision (DSM-IV -TR) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) 
continued to use the DID nomenclature, and modified the textual content from the DSM­
IV's text. The DSM-IV -TR modifications focus on cultural issues, noting that cases of 
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DID "have been documented in a variety of cultures around the world" (p. 528), and that 
the symptomatology of dissociative disorders may "take different forms in different 
cultures, such as recurrent brief episodes of dissociative stupor or spirit possession in 
India" (p. 519). The DSM-TV-TR cites the following criteria for the diagnosis of DID: 
A. 	 The presence of two or more distinct identities or personality states 
(each with its own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to, 
and thinking about the environment and self). 
B. 	 At least two of these identities or personality states recurrently take 
control ofthe person's behavior. 
C. 	 Inability to recall important personal information that is too extensive to 
be explained by ordinary forgetfulness. 
D. The disturbance is not dueto the direct physiological effects of a 
substance (e.g., blackouts, or chaotic behavior during Alcohol 
Intoxication) or a general medical condition (e.g., complex partial 
seizures). Note: In children, the symptoms are not attributable to 
imaginary playmates or other fantasy play (p.529). 
Rationale for DID diagnostic criteria. Peterson (1996) reviews the purpose for 
each of the criterion stated in the DSM-IV, which are equally applicable to the DSM-JV­
TR criteria: 
1) Purpose of Criterion A is: to describe that the person experiences 
autonomous self-states and to establish the nature and complexity ofthe 
self-states. 2) Purpose of Criterion B is: to determine that the self-states 
take over control of the person's behavior. 3) Purpose ofCriterion C is: to 
distinguish that amnesia is present. 4) Purposes of Criterion D are: to rule 
out substance abuse or medical conditions and to exclude phenomena 
found in normal childhood (p. 4). 
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The DSM-IV represents a substantial gain in recognizing DID in children. Peterson 
(1996) comments "no longer will an infonned child psychiatrist order the clinician to 
show me where it is in the DSM" (p.ll). Perhaps the lack of knowledge about child and 
adolescent DID could be attributed to the fact that the first text devoted to dissociative 
disorders in children was not published until the mid-1980's (Kluft, 1985). However, 
information and research about dissociative disorders in children and in adolescents is 
rapidly growing (Peterson, 1996) rather than continuing to be gleaned from the adult 
literature on dissociative pathology. Nevertheless, experts in diagnosing DID in children 
and in adolescents still believe that accurate diagnosis of DID depends upon improving 
clinical descriptors of DID in children and in adolescents, as well as in more 
developmentally suitable diagnostic criteria (Dell, 2001; Peterson, 1996; Putnam, 1994, 
1996). 
Prevalence a/DID. The DSM-IV TR statement related to the prevalence of DID 
in the United States encapsulates the essence of the controversy surrounding the 
diagnosis of DID: 
Some believe that the greater awareness of the diagnosis 
among mental health professionals has resulted in the 
identification ofcases that were previously undiagnosed. 
In contrast, others believe that the syndrome has been 
over diagnosed in individuals who are highly suggestible (p.528). 
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Ross (1997) observes that there has been an exponential increase in the diagnosis of DID 
not only in North America, but also in other countries such as Turkey, Norway, Japan, 
The Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand. Lowenstein (1993) believes that 
dissociative disorders are the most common psychiatric disorders in the world. The DSM­
IV-TR lends credence to these dissociative experts' observations, noting that cases of 
DID "have been documented in a variety of cultures around the world" (p.839). 
Prevalence data on children and adolescents with dissociative disorders is sparse 
with only 10% of DID cases diagnosed prior to age twenty (Kluft, 1985). Of those 
diagnosed prior to age twenty, 3% were under twelve years of age and 8% were between 
12 and 19 years of age (Kluft, 1985). A more recent study found that of 231 children and 
adolescents admitted for treatment, 23% met the DSM-III-R diagnostic criteria for DID 
(Waterbury, 1991). DID is, however, more commonly diagnosed in individuals in their 
late twenties to early thirties (Horevitz & Braun, 1984; Putnam, et aI., 1986). 
Kluft (1985) reports that 20 adult patients meeting the criteria for DID had been in 
therapy for more than 10 years without the clinician considering aDID diagnosis. 
Researchers of adult populations have estimated a time frame of six to seven years from 
the time a patient enters the mental health system, each reporting an average of 6.8 other 
diagnoses, before receiving a diagnosis of DID (Coons, Bowman, & Milstein, 1988; Ross 
Norton, & Wozney, 1989). Hornstein and Putnam (1992) found that children in their case 
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series had received an average of 2.7 inaccurate psychiatric diagnoses prior to the 
diagnosis of DID or Dissociative Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (DDNOS) with the 
accurate diagnosis of DID or DDNOS more often made in the adolescent than in the 
children's population. 
Epidemiology ofDID. Epidemiological findings suggest a higher rate of 
dissociative disorders than previously considered (Putnam, 1995; Ross, Joshi & Currie, 
1989). Putnam (1995) estimates that approximately 1 % ofthe North American general 
popUlation and 3% to 5% of North American psychiatric patients meet criteria for a 
dissociative disorder. Researchers report that 1 % to 10% of all psychiatric patients meet 
the dissociative disorder diagnostic criteria (Bliss & Jeppsen, 1985; Ross, 1991; Ross, 
Anderson, Fleisher, & Norton, 1991; Ross, Norton, & Wozney, 1989). Ross (1997) 
speculates that 5% to 10% of children in the United States will develop a dissociative 
disorder prior to the age of 18. 
Despite controversy surrounding the diagnosis of DID, there is a consensus that 
DID is sequelae of early childhood traumatic experiences often involving sexual and 
physical abuse or neglect of a child who uses dissociation as a defense against the 
overwhelming feelings related to the trauma (Putnam, 1985; Swica, Lewis & Lewis, 
1996). The National Institute ofMental Health (NIMH) found that 97 percent of adult 
DID patients repolied sexual, physical, and emotional abuse during childhood although 
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skeptics of DID question the methodology ofthis study as the research lacks outside 
corroboration that the reported trauma actually occurred (Putnam, 1989). 
Gender issues .The ratio for male to female adults with DID ranges from 1 to 4 to 
1 to 9 (American Psychiatric Press, 1994; Ross, 1997; Schultz, Braun, & Kluft, 1989). 
However, research with male prison populations suggests a high rate of DID (Allison & 
Schwarz, 1980) lending credence to Putnam's (1993) speculations that males with DID 
are more likely to be found in the criminal justice system and in addiction treatment 
populations, but females with DID are more likely to be found in the mental health 
system. Hacking (1995) concurs with Putnam (1993) speculating that males with DID 
will come not only :from the justice system but also :from the veterans' administration 
where trauma disorders are common. Differing :from Putnam (1993), Hacking (1995) 
believes that the diagnosis ofDID is more prevalent for females as a consequence of 
clinicians' attitudes towards gender rather than in attitudes towards dissociative 
pathology. 
Dell and Eisenhower (1990) hypothesize that children and adolescents with DID 
may increase the prevalence rate of DID in males because disturbed male children create 
more chaos than disturbed female children, bringing the male children and adolescents to 
the attention of mental health providers. Perhaps their hypothesis will be supported as 
gender ratios are more fully equilibrated in children and in adolescents with DID than in 
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the gender ratios of their adult counterparts. Although sample sizes are small, findings 
for male to female ratios of children and adolescents diagnosed with DID are closer to 1 
to 1 (Vincent & Pickering, 1988; Waterbury, 1991). 
Theoretical models ofdissociation. Navajits (1997) emphasizes the fact that 
theory is created from beliefs and that implicit theory, or private assumptions, stem from 
explicit theory; both are fallible. The beliefs and private assumptions of proponents and 
skeptics of DID are elucidated from divergent etiological pathways. Proponents of DID 
utilize the trauma-based pathway; skeptics of DID, however, utilize the iatrogenic 
pathway. Contemporary theoretical models that will be described are: the BASK Model 
(Braun, 1984, 1988); Four-Factor Theory (Kluft, 1986); the Discrete Behavioral State 
Theory (Putnam, 1989, 1997); and the Sociocognitive Model (Spanos, 1994,1996). 
The BASK model. Braun's (1988) BASK model of dissociation is an acronym for 
Behavior, Affect, Sensation, and Knowledge formulated from a psychobiological 
perspective of state dependent learning. Braun (1988) posits that when behavior, affect, 
sensation, and knowledge are congruent, parallel processes on a time continuum, there is 
a stable consciousness. The BASK model posits that dissociation may involve separation 
of one, or any combination of the normally integrated functions of behavior, affect, 
sensation, and knowledge in response to a stressor. Braun (1984) speculates that: 
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Multiple personalities ... are created via repeated dissociation that occurs under 
extreme stress, most often child abuse. These dissociations often have similar 
affective states ... that chain them together so that they can develop a 
history ... range of emotions ... and set response patterns (p.63). 
Braun (1988) posits that dissociative response patterns, reinforced by repeated abuse, 
interrupt the congruency of behavior, affect, sensation, and knowledge so that the brain 
encodes experience in a dissociative, fragmented manner. Braun's (1988) model 
functions as a paradigm for clinically assessing a range of dissociative states from normal 
daydreaming to DID, serving to monitor clinical changes over time of a traumatized 
patients' behavior, affect, and cognition (Fine, 1990). 
The Four-Factor Theory. Kluft's (1984) Four-Factor Theory posits that DID 
develops when a child has the capacity to dissociate (Factor 1), and when traumatic life 
experiences overwhelm the child's adaptive non-dissociative capacities (Factor 2). Kluft 
(1987) views the potential for dissociation as a biological element of hypnosis, finding 
that abused individuals score higher than non-abused individuals on hypnotizability and 
dissociation. Other researchers (Bliss, 1983; Frishholz, 1985; Spiegel, 1991) concur with 
Kluft (1987) in finding that DID patients are biologically highly hypnotizable. Ganaway 
(1989) views dissociatioij phenomenologically, as a capacity for auto-hypnotic trance 
experiences. 
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Cross sectional developmental studies (Macfie, et aI., 2001) find that dissociation 
normally decreases during a child's pre-school years, and that adolescents demonstrate 
less dissociation than younger children. Research findings related to Factor 2 support a 
positive correlation between trauma (sexual abuse, physical abuse, and neglect) and 
dissociation for children from preschool through late adolescence, finding that maltreated 
children do not follow the normative dissociation trajectory found in cross sectional 
developmental studies: the older the child, the less dissociation (Hornstein & Putnam, 
1992; Macfie, et aI., 2001; Putnam, 1996; Ross, 1997). 
Kluft (1984) posits the idea that available natural psychological substrates are 
utilized to develop personality formations (Factor 3), and the failure of significant others 
to protect the child against further overwhelming trauma leads to the fixation of 
separateness (Factor 4). The shaping influences and substrates can determine the form of 
dissociative defense, and this absence of protection leads to a failure in soothing, 
restorative experiences. Kluft: (1986) conceptualizes the phenomenological expression of 
DID as the final common pathway in "a unique configuration of intrapsychic structures 
and dynamics and environmental influences" (p.88). Kluft: (1991) identifies shaping 
influences related to Factor 3: contradictory parental demands, reinforced role-playing, 
non-supportive environments, multiple caretakers, double-bind messages and the 
presence of a DID parent, as was noted in Braun's (1985) transgenerational research on 
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dissociation. In Factor 4, the lack of protection for the child is a major factor in the 
continuation of the child's experiencing ongoing trauma as well as in developing 
maladaptive dissociative response patterns to escape the inescapable trauma. 
The discrete behavioral states model. Putnam's (1997) discrete behavioral states 
model is a developmental approach, extrapolated from research of infant behavioral 
states, positing three substrates for the development of DID: a human being's capacity to 
develop DID; an ability to enter a dissociative state; and the ability to fantasize and 
project personality onto objects and situations. Congruent with other proponents of DID 
(Braun, 1984; Kluft, 1984; Ludwig, 1983), Putnam (1989) views dissociative states as 
adaptive responses that function to provide: 
1)escape from the constraints of reality; 2) containment of traumatic 
memories and affects outside of normal conscious awareness; 3) alteration 
or detachment of sense of self (so that the trauma happens to someone else 
or to a depersonalized self); 4) analgesia (p.S3). 
Putnam (1989, 1997) describes the organization of human behaviors as a series of 
discrete states that are present at birth and smoothed out as development QCcurs so that 
transition between these states is difficult to detect as an integrated sense of self develops. 
Putnam (1989,1997) notes that these series of discrete behavioral states present in infants 
suggest that all human beings are born with the potential for developing DID. Putnam 
(1989) describes DID as "a psychobiological response to a relatively specific set of 
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experiences occurring within a circumscribed developmental window" (45). Putnam 
(1997) posits that similar psychobiological mechanisms may be present in mood 
disorders as he draws parallels between the affective states demonstrated in individuals 
having mood disorders with the discrete states exhibited by individuals having DID, 
comparing switches between affective states to the state transitions and switches of 
individuals with DID. 
Putnam (1989) posits that since children have a high normative capacity to enter 
dissociative states, children are prone to use dissociation as a defensive function when 
faced with overwhelming trauma. A child's ability to enter a dissociative state is 
conceptualized by Putnam (1989) as "significant alterations in the integrative functions of 
memory for thoughts, feelings, or actions, and significant alterations in sense of self' (p. 
52). Putnam (1997) predicts that increased recognition of DDs in childhood will result in 
a rapid rise in the numbers of diagnosed cases. As with adults, the rapid rise may be 
mistaken as evidence of iatrogenesis, adding fuel to the controversy between trauma­
based versus iatrogenic pathways and between proponents and skeptics of DID. 
The sociocognitive model. The sociocognitive model posits the idea that DID, like 
other forms ofmultiple identity role enactments, is a socially constructed, context-bound, 
goal-directed, social behavior dependent upon others' expectations; furthermore, the 
changes in identities over time are to meet changing expectations of others in varied 
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social contexts (Spanos, 1996). Within this model, DID is conceptualized as the North 
American version of contextually dependent multiple identity role enactments, a social 
construct, rather than a valid psychiatric diagnosis (Kenny, 1998). Role enactments of 
multiple selves are not the product of conscious deception, as no conscious awareness is 
involved; DID is viewed as the product of the social roles required to meet the demand 
characteristics of various social contexts (Lilienfeld, et ai., 1999). Thus, trauma based and 
iatrogenic based models have congruency in two areas: the experience of multiple self-
states is not a deception, and there is not a conscious awareness in the production of the 
experience of multiple self-states. The issue of deception remains controversial as 
researchers (Dinwiddie, North, & Yutzy, 1993) found that DID, especially in forensic 
cases, could not be differentiated from malingering, yet other researchers (Lewis, Yeager, 
Swica, Pincus, & Lewis, 1996) found cases of childhood symptomatology of DID in 
\ 
adults convicted of murder that could differentiate DID from malingering. 
Proponents of the sociocognitive model view the etiology of DID as stemming 
from varied social contexts such as the relationship between the therapist and the patient 
(Lilienfeld, et ai., 1999). Spanos (1994) postulates that iatrogenic factors attributed to the 
therapist include suggesting multiplicity, utilizing hypnosis to produce the symptom 
profile, and contributing to the shaping of the multiple identity enactments via 
reinforcement. The iatrogenic factors attributed to the patient are media and book 
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presentations of multiple identities such as Sybil and Eve, and meeting the therapists' 
expectations (Spanos, 1994). 
Spanos searches for a scientific account of the social contexts that condition 
individuals for multiple identity role enactment, yet discounts the research of DID 
proponents such as Kluft, Putnam, and Ross, suggesting that they are also participants in 
the social construction of a reality that produces multiple personalities (Bieber, 1998). 
Perhaps, this accounts for Spanos' (1994) belief that DID is the creation of a handful of 
therapists who are responsible for the increased numbers of reported cases ofDID; this is 
in opposition to the idea that the increase in numbers of reported cases ofDID is 
correlated to changes in establishing a separate diagnostic category ofdissociative 
pathology and research based screening and diagnostic instruments 
Needfor diagnostic instruments for DID. Berenson (1998) cites factors relevant to 
frequently missed diagnoses in child and adolescent psychiatry: symptom overlap; 
clinical training that emphasizes adherence to DSM criteria rather than the exploration of 
risk factors, current stressors, culture, and family dynamics; high rates of co morbidity; 
informed observers' perceptions; and developmental influences on symptomatology. 
Research findings on prior diagnoses of children with DDs indicate that ADHD, 
psychotic disorders, mood disorders, and oppositional conduct disorders were the most 
commonly cited prior diagnoses (Hornstein & Tyson, 1991; Peterson, 1996). These 
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research findings relevant to missed DDs diagnoses in children and adolescents lend 
credence to both proponents and skeptics of DID that there is a need for the following 
instruments to assess for dissociative pathology in children and adolescents: the Child 
Dissociative Checklist (CDC), The Adolescent Dissociative Experiences Scale (A-DES), 
and The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative Disorder (SCID-D). 
Child Dissociative Checklist. Putnam and Peterson (1994) note that the 
development of the Child Dissociative Checklist (CDC) derived from two sources: prior 
childhood DID predictor lists (Fagan & McMahon, 1984; Kluft, 1984; Putnam, 1985) and 
clinical experience with children with DDs (Steinberg, 1996). The CDC is intended to be 
completed by someone familiar with the child's behaviors across a number of contexts 
(school; home, or play) over the preceding 12-month period. The form is completed by 
parents, foster parents, teachers and other adults in close contact with the child in both 
inpatient and outpatient settings; there are the usual accuracy and objectivity limitations 
of observer reports. Friedrich (1993) found that mothers of sexually abused children, 
who have often have been sexually abused themselves, demonstrated wide variations in 
accuracy in reporting their children's behaviors, and, in fact, children with DID often do 
have sexual abuse histories (Hornstein & Tyson, 1991). 
The 20 item behavioral CDC for preadolescents encompasses the following 
dissociative behaviors: (1) dissociative amnesias; (2) rapid shifts in: demeanor, access to 
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information, knowledge, abilities and age appropriateness of behavior; (3) spontaneous 
trance states; (4) hall ucinations; (5) alterations in identity; and (6) aggressive and sexual 
behavior (Putnam, 1994). The CDC provides a rapid, cost-effective way to screen for 
pathological dissociation in children, but it may also function as a monitor of treatment 
when administered serially (Nader, 1997). When used as a research tool, the CDC can 
quantify dissociative behavior for dimensional approaches to dissociative phenomenon 
(Putnam, 1997; Steinberg, 1996). The CDC has undergone unauthorized revisions thus 
Putnam and Peterson (1994) caution clinicians and researchers that the established 
reliability and validity apply only to the authorized versions of the CDC to determine the 
presence or absence of dissociative pathology in children (Putman, 1997). Translations of 
the CDC are still in progress (Nader, 1997). The as yet unknown influences of other 
cultures on CDC scores (Putnam, 1997) has the potential to fuel the acrimonious debate 

between proponents and skeptics of DID, as both sides acknowledge the fact that culture 

. may influence how one views dissociative processes (Putnam, 1997; Spanos, 1996). The 

use of the CDC is limited during adolescence since informed observers do not have as 
much access to the details of teen lives as compared with those of younger children 
(Putnam, 1997). Thus, self-report scales and diagnostic structured interviews are 
considered more feasible to screen for dissociative pathology in adolescence. 
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The Adolescent Dissociative Experiences Scale. The Adolescent Dissociative 
Experience Scale (A-DES) is a 30-item self-report measure based on the following 
constructs related to dissociation: amnesias, depersonalization, derealization, passive 
influence, identity alteration, and absorption (Armstrong, Carlson, Putnam, Libero, & 
Smith, 1997). The purpose ofthe A-DES is to screen, primarily adolescents for 
dissociative disorders; it is intended to be used from ages 10-21 (Steinberg, 1996). 
Preliminary studies indicate that the A-DES is a reliable and valid measure (Armstrong et 
aI., 1997; Putnam, 1997). Unlike the CDC, the A-DES has been translated into German to 
investigate a spectrum of traumatic events for mediating factors in the development of 
dissociative pathology in adolescents (Brunner, Parzer, Schuld, & Resch, 2000), 
providing the potential for researchers to investigate for cultural influences on both 
normative and pathological dissociation. 
The A-DES differs from the adult Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) in 
design, construct, and language, yet the cautions cited by Coons (1998) regarding DES 
scores may be also applicable to the A-DES scores. Coons (1998) cautions clinicians that 
DID patients may achieve normal scores related to denial or unawareness of symptoms; 
individuals attempting to fake DID may have scores in any range, depending on their 
knowledge of the symptoms they are simulating; other psychiatric illnesses such as 
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posttraumatic stress disorder, schizophrenia, and borderline personality have been known 
to obtain high scores on the DES (Coons, 1998). 
Structured clinical interview. The Structured Clinical Interview for Dissociative 
Disorders (SCID-D) is a clinician administered, structured interview that focuses on the 
five core dissociative symptoms (amnesia, depersonalization, derealization, identity 
confusion, and identity alteration) allowing clinicians to made diagnoses of dissociative 
disorders based on DSM-IV criteria (Steinberg, 1994). The SCID-D, which requires 
interviewer training, has good reliability and validity, based on extensive field trials 
funded by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) (Steinberg, 1996). 
Nevertheless, the SCID-D, requiring 2-3 hours to complete, consists of250 items, and the 
open-ended questions require not only supervised training, but also clinical sophistication 
for the interviewer (Putnam, 1997). Although originally designed for use with adult 
populations, the SCID-D has also been reliable in diagnosing dissociative pathology in 
adolescents as young as 14-years of age (Steinberg & Steinberg, 1995). 
Proponents ofDID can hope that the use ofobjective instruments and structured 
interviews designed to assess for dissociative pathology will improve diagnostic 
accuracy; however, skeptics ofDID are likely to view increased case numbers ofchildren 
and adolescents with DID as attributable to a handful ofclinicians who are proponents of 
DID. This is due to the fact that the usual battery of psychological testing for children and 
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adolescents cited in textbooks for assessment does not include assessing for dissociative 
pathology (Silberg, 1994). 
Diagnostic Features Profile and psychological testing. Individually administered 
psychological testing protocols remain the primary modality for describing 
psychopathology in clinical work with children, but standard psychological testing 
protocols do not usually include instruments focused on dissociative pathology. Silberg's 
(1996) Diagnostic Features Profile (DFP) was designed to operationalize features of 
dissociation, present during the testing process for dissociative children and adolescents. 
Since these features are rarely seen in non-dissociative children and adolescents, this may 
prove useful in early diagnosis of traumatized children, especially when there is blurring 
of boundaries between diagnoses. The research to ascertain unique or discriminating 
patterns of test responses in children suspected or diagnosed with DDs utilized a standard 
test battery that included: Wechsler IQ tests (Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of 
Intelligence-Revised, or Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-1Il), the Rorschach 
Test, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), the Sentence Completion Test, and drawing 
tasks in conjunction with the CDC and the DFP (Silberg, 1998). Findings indicated that 
the DFP behavioral variables more common in the dissociative group than in the control 
group were: forgetting, staring, unusual motor behaviors, dramatic fluctuations, fearful 
and angry reactions to stimuli, physical complaints during testing, and expressions of 
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internal conflicts. The DFP response markers more common in the dissociative group 
than the control group were: images of multiplicity, malevolent religiosity, dissociative 
coping, depersonalized imagery, emotional confusions, extreme dichotomization, images 
of mutilation and torture, and magical transformation (Silberg, 1998). Results indicated 
that the DFP behavioral and response variables selected 93% of the dissociative sample, 
lending support to the discriminate validity of DID and DDNOS as diagnostic categories 
in childhood. There are congruent parallels between the dissociative behavioral variables 
and response markers during psychological testing of children and adolescents who were 
investigated and with the poly symptomatic presentation of dissociative pathology. 
Poly symptomatic Phenomenon and Differential Diagnosis Issues 
Diagnostic enigma: contemporary and historical views. Breuer and Freud's 
nineteenth century case ofAnna 0., a 21 year-old female, is cited as a diagnostic enigma 
in the APA's (1994) "DSM-IV Casebook" illustrating the long-standing diagnostic 
symptom configuration inherent in c'ases presenting with dissociative pathology. Case 
discussants "doubt that many clinicians at the present time see patients quite like Anna 
0." (APA, 1994, p.515), who was originally diagnosed with hysteria. 
Discussants cite the chief complaint of Anna O. as numerous physical symptoms 
(cough, headaches, visual disturbances, contractures, anesthesia of extremities) noting 
that the diagnosis congruent with DSM-IV criteria would be Conversion Disorder. Anna 
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O.'s depressive symptoms (sleeplessness, suicidal ideation), subsequent to her father's 
death, do not meet the time criteria for a diagnosis of Major Depressive Episode. Her 
symptoms of alternating states ofconsciousness (sleep-like states, imagining the 
experience of childbirth) are indicative ofa DD. Since the discussants do not believe that 
these clinical descriptors meet specific DSM-IV criteria, the diagnosis is DDNOS. Anna 
0.' s symptoms indicative of a psychotic disorder (disorganized speech, hallucinations, 
possible delusions) lead to an additional diagnosis of Schizophrenia; yet, this does not 
"capture the essence of Anna 0.' s illness" (AP A, 1994, p.SI5). Hence, a Psychotic 
Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified is added to account for the nature of her psychotic 
symptoms. Although the discussants considered a diagnosis ofFactitious Disorder with 
Psychological symptoms, they ruled this out on the basis that neither Breuer nor Freud 
believed that she was intentionally exhibiting these symptoms. Thus, the discussants 
considered six different diagnoses from six different symptom configuration perspectives, 
settling on five different diagnoses to account for the polysymptomatic clinical picture of 
AnnaO. 
Proponents of DID (Bliss, 1986; Kluft, 1993, Ross, 1989) do not concur with the 
case book discussants' assertion that cases such as this are not often seen by 
contemporary clinicians and they view the case of Anna O. as a classical presentation of a 
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single case study of DID that is representative of contemporary cases of DID. Breuer 
described the complex, clinical presentation of Anna O. as: 
Two entirely distinct states of consciousness were present which alternated very 
frequently and without warning and which became more and more differentiated 
in the course of the illness. In one of these states she recognized her normal 
surroundings; she was melancholy and anxious, but relatively normal. In the other 
state she hallucinated and was "naughty" - that is to say, she was abusive, used to 
throw the cushions at people, so far as the contractures at various times allowed, 
tore buttons offher bedclothes and linen with those ofher fmgers which she could 
move, and so on. (Breuer & Freud, 1896, p.76). 
The polydiagnostic views of the case discussants as opposed to the views of proponents 
ofDID may have led Putnam (1991) to the suggestion that when clear, dissociative 
pathology exists in combination with other diagnostic categories, then the DD should be 
considered the super-ordinate diagnosis. While Anna o. presents an adult case, the 
complexities of psychiatric diagnoses presented by case discussants and proponents of 
DID are also applicable to children and adolescents. Hornstein and Putnam's (1992) 
research found that 80-90% of children and adolescents With DDs exhibited 
posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms. The need to approach diagnosis as a "superficial 
thought-organizing tool that may either enhance or interfere with a real understanding of 
an individual's difficulties" (Hornstein, 1996 p.43) is vital to resolving diagnostic 
enigmas. 
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The interest in identifying cases of DDs in children and adolescents was founded 
on contemporary clinicians' experiences with adults who described their experiences of 
the onset of DID as occurring in childhood (Kluft, 1996). As with nineteenth and 
twentieth century predecessors (Alvarado, 1989; Bowman, 1990; Ellenberger, 1970; 
Fine, 1988), single case report publications of DID in children and adolescents increased 
during the 1980's (Dell & Eisenhower, 1990; Fagan & McMahon, 1984; Kluft, 1984). 
Single case reports culminated in large case series research to accumulate data 
systematically on separately diagnosed samples of children and adolescents with 
dissociative pathology (Hornstein & Putnam, 1992; Peterson & Putnam, 1994). Data 
presented in single case reports and in large case series research findings led to the 
development of diagnostic instruments and interviews for DDs as well as in clinicians 
developing a framework to organize the complex symptom presentation for both 
diagnostic and treatment consideration (Hornstein, 1993, 1996; Putnam, 1997; Steinberg, 
1996). 
Organizational framework ofdissociative pathology. Peterson (1990) organized 
the most common behaviors manifested by pathologically dissociating children into the 
following categories: dissociative symptoms, process symptoms, behavioral symptoms, 
affective symptoms and posttraumatic symptoms. The dissociative symptoms cited are 
amnesia, trance-like behaviors and perplexing behavioral fluctuations. The process 
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symptoms cited include imaginary companionship, internal auditory hallucinations, and 
passive influence experiences. The behavioral symptoms cited are conduct problems, 
aggression, risk taking, and self-destructive behaviors. The affective symptoms cited are 
depression and explosive anger. The posttraumatic symptoms cited are disturbances in 
sleep, hypervigilance, and intrusive imagery. Obviously, these symptoms and behaviors 
are not exclusive to dissociative pathology (Hornstein, 1996; Lewis, et aI., 1996; 
Peterson, 1990; Putnam, 1997), requiring the clinician to consider alternative diagnostic 
considerations, and requiring clinicians unfamiliar with the symptom presentation of 
childhood and adolescent dissociative pathology, and diagnostic uncertainty, to consult 
with clinicians knowledgeable about dissociative pathology in children and adolescents. 
(Hornstein, 1996). 
Guidelines to differential diagnosis ofDID. Diagnostic symptoms such as 
hallucinations, attentional focus and memory problems are not diagnostically specific 
(Hornstein, 1996). Thus, Nemzer's (1996) behaviorally based guide to differential 
diagnosis for DID in children and adolescents may prove a useful tool to resolving 
diagnostic enigmas. Nemzer (1996) differentiates DID from schizophrenia, mania, 
depression, PTSD and ADHD along eight dimensions: attention and memory problems, 
aggression, risk-taking, self-injury, mood and mood lability, sleep problems, anxiety and 
hyperarousal, and thought disorder. In patients with attention and memory problems the 
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clinician can differentiate DID from ADHD by comparing and contrasting the 
presentation of attention and memory problems in DID with ADHD. In those with DID, 
attention and memory problems are too extensive for ordinary forgetfulness. Memories 
are variable or absent. Information is often self-contradictory, appearing to be 
disorganized. Trance states are common and the individual is inconsistently inattentive. 
On the other hand, attention and memory problems in ADHD present as sensitivities to 
non-specific external stimuli. Unlike the DID patient, the patient with ADHD has a 
consistent distractibility and a short attention span. 
Nernzer (1996) differentiates DID from schizophrenia on the thought disorder 
dimension, noting that with DID hallucinations are experienced as internal, often 
identifiable voices, and reality testing is intact; however, in schizophrenia auditory 
hallucinations are experienced as external, voices are unintelligible or whispering, and 
reality testing is impaired. The anxiety and hyperarousal of the DID patient is 
demonstrated in hyper-reactivity and hypervigilance. The patient is easily startled, and 
panics when someone resembles the perpetrator; on the other hand, the schizophrenic 
patient's anxiety, correlates to paranoid or delusional thinking. With DID, the patient 
self-injures to relieve tension or numbing, often feeling detached from the event as if it 
were not happening to him or her as if the injury might be due to a punitive alter 
personality; with schizophrenia, the patient self-injures due to paranoid or delusional 
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thinking. Although both DID and schizophrenic patients exhibit a reckless disregard for 
danger, the DID blocks the awareness of risk, minimizes the perception of pain and 
danger, and may be demonstrating a conditioned dissociative response to external 
traumatic stimuli; in contrast, the schizophrenic's failure to assess danger is due to 
delusional thinking. The aggressive behaviors in DID give the appearance of being 
unprovoked, yet deliberate; amnesia for the behavior may reflect an abrupt switch from 
one alter to another; however, the aggressive behaviors in schizophrenia are reactions to 
paranoid or delusional thoughts. The attention and memory problems inherent in DID 
manifest by amnesia that is beyond ordinary forgetfulness, by a highly variable memory, 
by self-contradictory information giving the appearance of disorganization, by trance 
states and by an inconsistent inattentiveness; the attention and memory problems in 
schizophrenia manifest by disorganized thought processes and by delusional personal 
information. 
Armstrong and Lowenstein (1990) describe the fonnidable challenges to 
psychological testing of adolescents with DDs that are congruent with Silberg'S (1996) 
research in developing the DFP. The challenges are related to dissociative pathology as 
evidenced in internal dividedness, in chronic state changes, in passive influence 
experiences, in interference and overlap phenomenon between alter personality states, as 
well as in co presence phenomena that produce a shifting and disorganized clinical 
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picture. Perhaps these challenges are attributable not only to the fact that the literature on 
the psychological testing of children and adolescents with DDs is sparse but also to the 
difficulty inherent in diagnosing DID in children and adolescents. 
The research on diagnostic criteria for dissociative pathology, the theoretical 
models, the testing instruments and the structured interviews to assess for dissociative 
pathology, the frameworks to organize dissociative pathology, and the guidelines to 
differential diagnosis of DID continue to fuel the 1988 debate, "Resolved that Multiple 
Personality is a True Disease Entity" presented at the American Psychiatric Association 
in Montreal, Canada. The proponents (Richard Kluft and David Spiegel) of DID and 
skeptics (Martin Orne and Fred Frankel) of DID failed to resolve the same issues of 
credibility of traumatic memory, research methodology problems, organizational and 
media influences, and legal concerns. 
Professional organizational opinions. The American Psychological Association 
(APA) has no official policy statement on the controversies surrounding adult memories 
of childhood sexual abuse within the field ofpsychology, but the Association does report 
the findings of the six clinical psychologists and researchers appointed to the Working 
Group on Investigation of Memories of Childhood Abuse formed in 1993 to review the 
literature on trauma and memory making recommendations to professionals and to the 
public (AP A, 1996). The decision of the AP A (1996) to exclude terms such as "repressed 
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memories", "recovered memories", "false memories", and "implanted memories" from 
this report was based on their belief that the emotional impact of these terms makes 
rational, scientific discussion improbable, yet these are the terms often used in the trauma 
and memory literature (Applebaum, Uyehara & Elin, 1997). 
While the consensus addresses adult memories of childhood sexual abuse, the 
achieved consensus may be equally applicable to children and adolescents who often 
present denying even corroborated sexual abuse events (Lewis, 1996; Steinberg, 1996) 
despite the proximity in time of the abusive events. The AP A (1996) consensus 
conclusions are: 
1.) Most people who were sexually abused as children remember all or part of 
what happened to them.2.) Under certain circumstances, memories of abuse that 
have been forgotten for a long time can be remembered. The mechanism by which 
such delayed recall occurs is not currently well understood.3.)Under certain 
circumstances it is possible to construct pseudo-memories. These are potentially 
harmful and disruptive to the person in whom they are induced as well as to his or 
her social support network.4.) There are gaps in our knowledge about the 
processes that lead to accurate or inaccurate recollection of childhood sexual 
abuse.5.) Future research is needed to provide a better understanding of the 
mechanisms by which accurate or inaccurate recollections might be identified. 
6.) There are gaps in our knowledge of the most effective clinical approaches for 
avoiding creation of pseudo-memories and for enhancing the conditions under 
which actual events of childhood sexual abuse can be remembered.7.)Given the 
present state of our understanding, there is no method, absent corroborative 
evidence, for determining absolute differences between actual and pseudo­
memories (p.1 ,2). 
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The report by the APA's Working Group on Investigation of Memories of 
Childhood Abuse in 1993 does not include the list of articles reviewed by the group. 
However, a comprehensive discussion ofthe research findings related to the debate about 
the veracity ofmemories related to childhood sexual and physical abuse can be found in 
"Trauma and memory: Clinical and legal controversies" (Appelbaum, Uyehara, & Elin, 
1997). 
Psychological research via the Internet. The use of the Internet for research and 
practice purposes in the field of psychology is rapidly evolving. Recognizing the Web­
based revolution for both scientists and practitioners in psychology, the Ethics Committee 
of the AP A (1997) acknowledged that the Ethics Code is "not specific with regard to 
telephone therapy or teleconferencing or any electronically provided services and has no 
rules prohibiting such services." Although consideration to future revisions ofthe Ethics 
Code may allow for more definitive criteria, the Ethics Committee ofthe AP A (1997) 
currently recommends that psychologists contemplating delivering services via 
telephone, teleconferencing, or Internet "review the characteristics ofthe services... and 
the provisions for confidentiality" as well as adhering to Standard 1.04c, Boundaries of 
Competence, " ... take reasonable steps to ensure competence of their work and to protect 
patients, clients, students, research participants, and others from hann." Although one of 
the most rapidly growing procedures in psychological experimentation is that of 
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collecting empirical data over the Internet (Burdenski, 200 I), one must consider not only 
the advantages but also the disadvantages of Internet data collection. 
Internet advantages and disadvantages. Burdenski (2001) notes that the use of the 
Internet to collect data is an advantage in: (1) generating large heterogeneous samples; 
(2) opportunities to conduct cross-cultural research without travel expenses; (3) automatic 
coding and construction of data; (4) reduction in needed support staff; and (5) improved 
standardization of experimenter effects. Nevertheless, Burdenski (2001) cautions that 
there are ethical and legal concerns to consider~ such as: (l) involving international 
participants means that researchers need to be cognizant that cultural and political factors 
may affect the participants responses; (2) cyberspace can mislead researchers about 
geographical location, gender, race, and age; (3) the economic and racial gap between 
users and nonusers of the Internet raises issues about representative samples; (4) 
obtaining infonned consent; and (5) the lack of definitive guidelines from the AP A Ethics 
Code Revision Task Force due to the rapid evolution of the use of the Internet by both 
scientists and practitioners. 
Reips (2000) summarizes methodological advantages and disadvantages of using 
the Web for research. The advantages relevant to this study are: (l) ease of access to 
large numbers of participants; (2) ease of access to a specific population; (3) avoidance of 
time constraints for participants; (4) completely voluntary participation; 
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(5) reduction of demand characteristics; (6) cost savings of administration; and (7) public 
control ofethical standards. The disadvantages relevant to this study are: (1) possible 
multiple submissions; (2) a high dropout rate due to no financial consideration; (3) the 
absence of interaction between researcher and participants when instructions are 
misunderstood; and (4) external validity is limited due to dependence on computers and 
networks. 
Solutions to methodological disadvantages. The use of AP A membership e-mail 
addresses that will be described in the procedures section of the methods chapter is a 
common solution to maintain data integrity by identifying multiple submissions. Musch 
and Reips (2000) also cite other procedures to maintain data integrity such as asking 
respondents to participate only once, to use Cookies. Financial consideration for 
participation is not considered an option since this study addresses professionals who 
hopefully understand the seriousness of research as well as the need to obtain data based 
on scientific methodology. The instructions for this survey will be reviewed by four 
professionals for clarity of instructions before e-mailing the survey to prospective 
participants. There will be beta testing ofthe site for errors prior to posting the survey 
officially, to determine that the survey is comprehensible and readable for participants 
who will be using a variety ofcomputers and to insure that the site is properly collecting 
data. 
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A concern prevalent on the WWW is that hackers are attempting to gain control 
over the Web server (Schmidt, 1997). However, Musch and Reips (2000) respondents 
report presently there is no evidence of hackers sabotaging psychological experiments on 
the Internet. The equivalency of response rates for the traditional method of mailing 
surveys versus the response rates of electronic surveys has been explored. Studies (Mehta 
& Sivadas, 1995; Weible & Wallace, 1998) found equivalency of response rates for both 
methods. The mean and range on Likert scale responses are equivalent for both survey 
methods (Kiesler & Sproull, 1986; Mehta & Sivadas, 1995). Despite the astounding 
equivalency between these data collection methods, some differences have been found. 
Electronic participants wrote more, and the writing was more complex (Mehta & Sivadas, 
1995) than the paper and pencil method when answering open-ended questions. 
Ethical issues for Internet use. The differences in ethical considerations between 
paper and pencil traditional survey methods and Web-based survey methods, surrounding 
informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality as well as the assurance to subjects that 
they can quit at any time have been explored by other researchers (Mueller, Jacobsen, & 
Schwarzer 2000). The National Institute of Mental Health (2000) conference on ethical 
considerations in mental health addressed issues of informed consent, privacy, role 
conflict, dealing with emergencies, institutional review boards, and technology issues. 
Conference attendants noted that the use of the Internet should not be held to higher 
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standards than current research procedures and reached agreement on procedures for 
minimizing risk for each issue under discussion. In keeping with the NIMH 
recommendations, the issues of anonymity, confidentiality, and voluntary cessation at 
any time will be briefly described to the subjects in the posting for the survey per se as 
presented in the procedure section of this study. The issue of informed consent for 
Internet surveys differs from the more traditional mail survey method: mail surveys have 
no formal consent form but rather have a letter introducing the subject to the research 
topic as well as to the researcher, and the return of the survey by the subject is considered 
to be consent. On the other hand, Internet research does not allow for obtaining the 
subjects' signature. Hence, the guidelines for consent described by other Web researchers 
such as utilizing the initial page of the survey as a consent form (Mueller, 1997; Smith & 
Leigh, 1997), and the commonplace practice in the real world of clicking on "agree" or 
I 
"accept" buttons will be considered as the participant's consent to participate in this 
study. 
Hypotheses 
1. 	 Psychologists who treat children and adolescents will demonstrate skepticism 
about DID on the Skepticism Scale, using a cutoff score of 33. 
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2. 	 There will be an inverse relationship between professional skepticism about DID 
on the Skepticism Scale and professional knowledge about DID on the 
Knowledge Scale among psychologists who treat children and adolescents. 
3. 	 As the years of experience in psychology increase, psychologists' scores 
indicative of skepticism about DID in children and in adolescents will increase. 
4. 	 As the years ofexperience in psychology increase, psychologists' scores 
indicative of knowledge about DID in children and in adolescents will decrease. 
5, 	 Membership in the International Society for the Study of Dissociation (ISSD) and 
in the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies (ISTSS) will demonstrate 
a negative correlation with items indicative of skepticism about DID in children 
and in adolescents and will demonstrate a positive correlation with items 
indicative of knowledge about DID in children and in adolescents. 
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Method 
Participants 
Soliciting participant recruitment for Web based research from lists related to the subject 
matter is a common technique that improves the validity of the study (Buchanan & 
Smith, 1999). Thus, a convenience sample of child and adolescent psychologists was 
recruited via the Internet using the 2000 and 2003 membership lists for the Society of 
Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology Division 53 of the American Psychological 
Association (AP A, 2000; AP A, 2003). 
There are 1,512 Division 53 members listed in the American Psychological 
Association's Directory for 2000 and 2003 (AP A, 2000; APA 2003) with e-mail 
addresses. Initially, only those members with e-mail addresses (N=723) listed in the 2000 
Membership Registry (AP A, 2000) were recruited as potential participants. However, the 
large number ofmailer daemons (160), combined with a low return rate (N=1), a week 
after the initial e-mailing indicated that the pool for potential participants needed to be 
revised to increase the potential return rate. Therefore, a request was sent to the IRB and 
approved by the IRB to include members from the more updated on-line 2003 Division 
53 membership (APA, 2003). 
A separate Website server was utilized and monitored by a research assistant to 
ensure anonymous participation and to provide an on-line data file accessible only to the 
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researcher who knew the account password. The cross-sectional design included the 
following characteristics of psychologists who treat children and adolescents: gender, 
age, highest degree obtained, race, years of experience in field of psychology, number of 
seminars/conferences attended related to DID, primary work setting, job title, theoretical 
orientation, number of children assessed in a year, number of adolescents assessed in a 
year, years of experience in the field, and professional organization membership. 
Overview ofthe Research Design 
This survey used a cross-sectional design to investigate the presence or absence of 
skepticism about DID and the knowledge about DID which correlates with the accurate 
diagnose of DID in an adolescent by psychologists who treat children and adolescents. 
Measures 
The instrument to study the accuracy of diagnosis, knowledge and skepticism of 
psychologists who treat children and adolescents consisted of three parts: (a) Partl 
entailed completing the diagnosis on two vignettes, (b) Part 2 queried items related to 
skepticism and knowledge about DID and Schizophrenia, and (c) Part 3 entailed 
completing demographic information. Participants were requested to respond to each of 
the vignettes prior to answering questions cited in Part 2 of the survey. 
Case vignettes. The case vignettes were created in accordance with the DSM-IV 
TR criteria of symptomatology and essential features ofDID. Across the vignettes, 
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factors that were not integral to the diagnosis were held constant. For example, since DID 
is more commonly diagnosed in females than in males, the DID adolescent was female. 
The credibility of the vignettes was established by Hayes and Mitchell's (1994) research 
involving therapists' skepticism about MPD in adult patients. Since there were changes 
(age of patient, occupation to student status) made in the vignettes, an independent 
review to ascertain the usability of the revised vignettes for this study was completed by 
Richard Kluft, MD, a professional experienced in diagnosing DID and schizophrenia in 
adolescents. 
Scoring for the vignettes was as follows. For an inaccurate diagnosis, a score of 0 
was assigned. For an accurate diagnosis of DID, a score of 1 was assigned. Respondents 
provided diagnoses in an open-ended manner as opposed to selecting from a list. 
Skepticism and knowledge survey. The survey instrument that was to be 
completed after a diagnosis was given for each of the vignettes consisted of 17 rationally 
derived items designed by Hayes and Mitchell (1994) to measure skepticism and 
knowledge about DID. Participants were asked to indicate their agreement using a 5­
point Likert scale, (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) unsure, (4) agree, and (5) 
strongly agree. Of the total 30 survey items: 11 items measured skepticism about DID; 6 
items measured knowledge about DID; the remaining 13 items were to distract from the 
focus on DID. 
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The survey instrument has a Cronbach's alpha of .85 and an unequal Spearman­
Brown split-half reliability coefficient of .84 for the Skepticism Scale and a Cronbach's 
alpha of .52 for the Knowledge Scale (Hayes & Mitchell, 1994). The researchers 
established construct validity for the Knowledge Scale using the contrasted groups 
method, which involved undergraduate students and mental health professionals. 
Demographics. Demographic characteristics (age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of 
postgraduate experience in the field, highest degree obtained, and professional 
organization membership) were included in Part 3. 
Procedures 
The 1,512 Division 53 members listed for 2000 and 2003 (APA, 2000; APA, 
2003) with e-mail addresses were recruited via the Internet for participation in this 
research, using Perseus software. Perseus software was selected because of the software's 
ability to allow individual participants to click into links, because of its branching 
capacity, and its ability to follow-up with a second request for participation to those who 
had not responded within two weeks. A research assistant prepared a spreadsheet with 
potential participants e-mail addresses for transfer to the computer software to ensure 
confidentiality. The Web site had a password and identification number for data access 
that was known and accessible only to the researcher; this is equivalent to a locked box 
used for postal mail surveys. 
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Four professionals reviewed and responded to the survey for clarity of 
instructions and of content before the survey was e-mailed to prospective respondents. 
There was testing of the Web site, by a research assistant, to determine that there were no 
program errors prior to officially e-mailing the data; to ensure that the survey was 
comprehensible and readable for participants who used a variety of computers; and to 
ensure that the independent Web site was functioning properly to collect the data. 
Despite these precautions to prevent technical problems for respondents, technical 
issues arose. For example, AOL does not allow for bulk e-mailing, assuming that this is 
indicative of sending out SPAM. Thus, the research assistant sent the e-mails in small 
groups. Nevertheless, AOL took measures to block e-mailing from the Web site, still 
believing that the large numbers of e-maiJs indicated SPAM. This issue was resolved 
within 24 hours via contacting AOL and explaining the nature of the bulk mailing, thus 
enabling the site to have the blocks removed. 
Informed consent was obtained by staging the survey so that the initial page was 
an information and consent page rather than part of the survey proper. Since it was not 
feasible to obtain the participant's signature, the participants were presented with an on­
screen button to click, thus accepting the terms of the consent form prior to proceeding to 
the actual survey. Since prospective participants were free to delete the e-mail, voluntary 
participation was assured. 
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An Excel Program spreadsheet was used to organize and sort the data collected by 
AP A member respondents. A research assistant reviewed the spreadsheet data in order to: 
screen for multiple submissions; to delete any identifying data such as IP headers, e-mail 
addresses, or members' names to ensure confidentiality; and to transfer the data via 
computer from the Excel Program spreadsheet to the SPSS program for statistical 
analysis. The use of a cookie prevented multiple submissions from respondents. 
Feedback was given by means ofa closing page to: to acknowledge submission, to thank 
the respondent, to provide contact information for the researcher, and to advise 
participants ofthe date and length of time that the results of the survey were posted on 
the Web server. 
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Results 
Participants and Demographics 
Of the 1512 surveys e-mailed to 2000 and 2003 members ofthe American 
Psychological Association Division 53 (AP A, 2000; AP A 2003),269 (17.7%) were 
invalid email addresses leaving a total of 1243 (82%) as valid e-mail addresses. Of the 
useable addresses, 1146 (92.2%) of the potential participants did not respond to the 
survey, despite a second e-mail request to participate; 34 (2.7%) ofthe participant pool 
completed the survey. Of the total number of potential subjects (1146), 21 (1.8%) 
responded that they did not want to participate, citing reasons such as they did not treat 
adolescents or they were in education or in government work; 19 (1.5%) sent an auto 
response; 19 (1.5%) reported technical problems; 12 (1 %) responded with a query such as 
a request for a reminder sent closer to the final date of data collection; and the remaining 
7 (.5%) responses were categorized as miscellaneous such as requests that the survey be 
sent via postal service. 
The respondents were predominately white (97.1 %), female (52.9%), and 
between 30 and 49 years of age (70.6%). All respondents had doctoral degrees (PhD, 
85.3%; PsyD, 14.7%). The majority ofrespondents practiced psychology froml t019 
years (64.8%). The primary work settings were identified as private practice (41.2%) and 
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University/College Academic positions (26.5%) with the predominately cited job title of 
clinical psychologist (85.3%). 
Skepticism, Knowledge, and Demographic Correlations. 
The correlation analyses were limited by the small sample size. Thus, the results 
of this study are primarily descriptive. As predicted, the hypothesis that the Skepticism 
and the Knowledge variables would have a negative correlation was supported but was 
not statistically significant (see Table 1). Both the Skepticism and Knowledge variables 
were used for correlation analyses with the following demographic variables: age, 
organizational membership, gender, highest degree obtained, number of children 1-12 
years old assessed in a year, number of adolescents 13-18 years old assessed in a year, 
race/ethnicity, seminars related to DID which had been attended, and years of practice. 
The results of these correlation analyses are presented in Table 1. There was a 
statistically significant relationship between the Skepticism variable and highest level of 
education obtained. There was also a statistically ·significant relationship between the 
Skepticism variable and race/ethnicity. There was also a statistically significant 
relationship between the Knowledge variable and the attendance at seminars related to 
DID. 
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Table 1 
Correlation Coefficients for Skepticism, Knowledge, and Demographic Variables 
Skepticism Scale Knowledge Scale 
Variables r p r p 
Skepticism Scale -.24 .09 
Knowledge Scale -.24 .09 
Age -.05 .79 .12 .50 
American Psychological Association8 .01 .97 -.04 .81 
American Psychological Society8,b -.03 .88 .05 .79 
Gendera .10 .57 .06 .74 
Highest level education -.35* .04 .32 .07 
No children 1-12 y.o. assessed .18 .31' -.09 .61 
No adolescents 13-18 y.o. assessed -.09 .62 .19 .28 
Race/ethnicity .42* .01 -.17 .35 
Seminars attended re: DID -.06 .72 .35* .05 
Years Practicing Psychology .14 .42 -.02 .92 
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Note. N =34. a Due to the dichotomous nature of this variable, the correlation coefficient 
and p-value reported in this table were calculated using a point-biserial correlation (rpb). b 
* n = 21. p< .05. 
Misdiagnoses 
Case Vignettes. Results demonstrated that DID was misdiagnosed with a greater 
frequency than schizophrenia (see Table 2). For the DID vignette, the other diagnoses 
(70.7%) were: acute stress disorder (2.9%), adjustment reaction disorder (2.9%), amnesia 
due to ... (2.9%), bipolar disorder (2.9%), depressive disorder (11.8%), dissociative 
amnesia (11.7), dissociative disorder (5.8%), depersonalization disorder (5.8%), 
posttraumatic stress disorder (11.7%), and schizoaffective disorder (2.9%). For the 
schizophrenia vignette, other alternate diagnoses (58.8%) were: adjustment disorder 
(2.9%), bipolar disorder (2.9%), depressive disorder (14.7%), psychotic disorders 
(17.6%), schizoaffective (2.9%), and schizophreniform (8.8%). On both the DID and 
schizophrenia vignettes, two respondents noted that there was insufficient information 
(5.8%) to make a primary diagnosis and one respondent deferred (2.9%) to cite a primary 
diagnosis. 
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Table 2 
Percentages for Frequency of Diagnostic Accuracy for Dissociative Identity Disorder 
(DID) and Schizophrenia Case Vignettes 
Diagnosis DID vignette Schizophrenia vignette 
(N=34) (N=34) 
j% j% 
Dissociative Identity Disorder 17.6 
Schizophrenia 2.9 41.2 
Dissociative Disorder NOS 8.8 
Other 70.7 58.8 
Note. Cells with a dash indicate no reported data obtained. 
Degrees ofSkepticism about DID 
The hypothesis that psychologists who treat children and adolescents would 
demonstrate the presence of Skepticism about DID on the Skepticism Scale, s'coring at or 
above the cutoff of 33 was not supported. Moderate to extreme skepticism about DID 
was reflected by scores greater than or equal to the theoretical midpoint of 33 on the 
Skepticism Scale. Five respondents (14.7%) scored greater than or equal to 33 on the 
Skepticism Scale, indicating moderate to extreme skepticism about DID. Twenty nine 
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respondents (85.2%) scored less than 33 on the Skepticism Scale, indicating a lesser 
degree of skepticism or an absence of skepticism about DID. 
The range for the Skepticism Scale scores was 20 - 37 (M =29.76, SD = 4.55). 
The frequency percentages for the Skepticism Scale items for strongly disagree and 
disagree, as well as strongly agree and agree, have been consolidated and are presented in 
Table 3. 
Psychologists' Knowledge about DID 
The hypothesis that psychologists who treat children and adolescents and who 
demonstrated the presence of skepticism about DID on the Skepticism Scale would have 
low scores on the Knowledge Scale about DID was not supported. The range for the 
Knowledge Scale scores was 15 - 23 (M = 19.05, SD = 2.05). The frequency percentages 
of the Knowledge Scale items have been condensed and are presented in Table 4. 
Experience in Psychology, Skepticism Levels, and Knowledge Scores 
The hypotheses that psychologists with increased years of experience in 
psychology would demonstrate the presence of skepticism about DID on the Skepticism 
Scale scoring at or above the cutoff of 33 and would demonstrate a decreased knowledge 
about DID on the Knowledge Scale were not supported. Of the total sample, 29 (85.3%) 
respondents had attended at least one seminar over the past five years during which they 
learned about DID; however, 11(32.3%) respondents had attended more than one 
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seminar. The number of children between the ages of 1 and 13 assessed in a year had a 
mean of 42.11. The number of adolescents between the ages of 13 and 18 assessed in a 
year had a mean of 33.79. 
ISSD, ISTSS Membership and Impact on Skepticism and Knowledge Scores 
The hypothesis that members of the ISSD and the ISTSS would demonstrate an 
absence of skepticism about DID and would demonstrate knowledge about DID was not 
supported due to lack of reported membership numbers. No participants were members of 
the ISSD and only one participant was a member of the ISTSS. The respondents' 
reported theoretical orientations varied: 12 (35.3%) respondents had no psychodynamic 
orientations, although 5 (14.7%) respondents used it 20% of the time. Eight (23.5%) 
respondents had a 50% learning orientation, yet 3 (8.8%) respondents had a 100% 
learning orientation. Ten (29.4%) respondents had no humanistic orientation, but 6 
(17.6%) respondents had a 20% orientation, and 21 (81.8%) respondents reported other 
orientations. The other orientations utilized are presented in Table 5 and the time 
percentage usage for these orientations ranges from 10% to 50%. 
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Table 3 
Frequency Percentages for Skepticism Scale Items 
Skepticism Scale Items Strongly DisagreelDisagree Strongly Agree/Agree 
(N= 34) 34) 
f% f% 
asa 38.2 38.3 
clinical phenomenon has been 
demonstrated beyond any 
reasonable doubt. 
DID is under-diagnosed. 47.1 14.7 
DID can be created in 26.4 58.9 
counseling/psychotherapy. 
DID is a misdiagnosis of 70.6 8.8 
schizophrenia. 
More funding should be 23.5 58.8 
devoted to research on DID. 
DID is largely an excuse used 82.4 17.6 
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Skepticism Scale Items Strongly DisagreelDisagree Strongly Agree/Agree 
(N= 34) (N= 34) 
j% j% 
to avoid responsibility for 
personal actions. 
DID is extremely rare. 26.5 58.8 
People can fake DID 29.4 52.9 
successfully. 
All of the symptoms related to 64.7 11.7 
DID can be explained by and 
accurately diagnosed as 
another psychological factor. 
DID does not exist. 79.4 8.8 
I would not diagnose someone 61.8 17.5 
as having DID. 
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Table 4 
Frequency Percentages for Knowledge Scale Items 
Knowledge Items Strongly Disagree/Disagree Strongly Agree/Agree 
(N= 34) (N= 34) 
f% f% 
Major trauma is a contributing 11.8 79.5 
factor to developing DID. 
The number of documented 14.7 50.0 
DID cases has increased over 
the past two decades 
DID is an Axis II disorder 72.5 
PTSD is classified as a 64.7 14.7 
dissociative disorder in the 
DSM. 
DID has been diagnosed more 2.9 85.3 
frequently in females than 
males. 
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The onset ofDID is invariably 17.6 47.0 
in childhood. 
Note. Cell with a dash indicates no data obtained. 
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Table 5 
Frequency Percentages ofOther Theoretical Orientations 
Other Theoretical Orientations (n = 13) 
f% 
Contextual-based 2.9 
Biological/Neurological and Attachment 2.9 
Biopsychosocial 2.9 
Construct Psychology 2.9 
Constructivist 2.9 
Family Systems 5.8 
Family / Ecological Systems 2.9 
Integrative 2.9 
Integrative / Developmental 2.9 
ISTSS 2.9 
Relational Family Systems 2.9 
Systemic 2.9 
Skepticism, DID, Adolescents 70 
Discussion 
The results of this study presented the statistical analyses related to psychologists' 
skepticism and knowledge about DID in diagnosing adolescents, using case vignettes and 
Skepticism and Knowledge Scales. This chapter will explore the implications of these 
findings and offer reflections about the low response rate, about case vignettes, and about 
Skepticism and Knowledge Scales for the paradigmatic dissociative disorder, DID. 
Considerations about Participants' Response Rate 
Since the literature related to Internet research indicated that there is no difference 
in response rates between traditional survey methods (postal mailing) versus Internet 
surveys (Birnbaum, 2000), the extremely low response rates to the initial and second 
requests for participation in the present study were astonishing. The recent dramatic 
increase in SP AM, the Internet equivalent of the telemarketer, could playa role in the 
potential subjects deleting the two e-mail invitations to participate in this study prior to 
reading the survey per se. Clues that some potential participants did not read the survey 
are evident in e-mails to the researcher from potential participants. For example, a 
potential participant reported that she participated only in IRB approved surveys. Since 
the Website hosting the Internet survey included an extensive informed consent form 
citing IRB approval, as well as information to directly contact the IRB Chairperson, one 
can assume this individual never reviewed the Website. 
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citing IRB approval, as well as information to directly contact the IRB Chairperson, one 
can assume this individual never reviewed the Website. 
Keeping in mind that those who did send e-mails to the researcher mayor may 
not have been included in the actual returned surveys, other potential participants' e­
mails provided further issues related to response rate; these bear consideration. Technical 
problems with certain browsers may have been unknown to the researcher, although 
some participants sent e-mails advising of technical problems that were easily solvable. 
The live testing of the Website with feedback from four professionals did not indicate 
technical concerns. Others, who had obviously read the Website survey, chose to e-mail 
messages that their self-perceptions indicated a lack of competency in diagnosing 
adolescents; that they worked only with prepubescent children, and/or their work areas 
excluded them from participation. Although most reported private practice as their 
primary work setting, others reported University/College Academic settings; the survey 
was up on the Website during April and May which are busy times for academicians in 
the throes of ending the scholastic semester. 
Despite all these possible rationales for low rate of return, it is difficult to believe 
that the 92.2%who did not respond to the survey fit into the above categories. This 
study's low response rate is consistent with Kluft's (1990) findings that scientific fonnats 
reluctantly address topics relevant to diagnosing DID. One could speculate that the topic 
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of the survey, Skepticism and Knowledge about DID, may be more reflective of the 
abysmal response rate than to any other consideration. Other researchers (Dunn, et aI., 
1994), experiencing similar low response rates about professional skepticism and DID, 
have also suggested that those who chose not to respond may be more skeptical of DID 
than those who did respond. 
This must be especially true if one notes that the majority of those who did 
respond to this survey were well educated and were knowledgeable about DID, having 
attended at least one, ifnot many, seminars about the topic of DID within the previous 
past five years. The rate of seminar/conference attendance was surprising, in light of the 
fact that a major conference about DID in children and adolescents hosted by Sheppherd 
and Enoch Pratt Institute in Baltimore, Maryland, a facility which has a specialty unit 
geared to assessing and treating DID in children and adolescents, was cancelled due to 
extremely poor registration within the previous past five years. 
Misdiagnoses ofDID 
Case Vignettes. It is noteworthy that although survey participants indicated an 
absence of skepticism and were knowledgeable about DID, only a small percentage of 
respondents (17.6%) accurately diagnosed the DID vignette. It is ironic that 47.1 % of 
participants for this survey strongly disagreed/disagreed that DID is under diagnosed, 
while almost twice as many respondents (82.4%) for this survey provided various false 
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negative diagnoses. These false negative diagnoses, from a majority of the sample, have 
unwittingly only added to the number of under diagnosed DID cases. It is a paradox that 
the DID vignette in this study was under diagnosed by the very participants who 
disagreed that DID is under diagnosed. 
This finding is congruent with dissociative experts' findings that DID is one of 
the most difficult mental disorders to diagnose (Kluft, 1991; Peterson, 1996; Putnam, 
1991). Some respondents did recognize the features of a dissociative pathology (DDNOS, 
8.8%; DD, 5.8%; Dissociative Amnesia 11.7%; Depersonalization Disorder, 5.8%; and 
PTSD, 11.7%), in the DID vignette, lending credence to dissociative experts' consistent 
findings that DID, the paradigmatic DD, is not often diagnosed in childhood and 
adolescents (Peterson, 1996; Putnam, 1991). 
Unlike prior research findings (Hayes & Mitchell, 1994; Ross & Norton, 1988) in 
the dissociative adult literature, in which DID is often misdiagnosed as schizophrenia, 
most respondents (70.6%) disagreed that DID is a misdiagnosis of schizophrenia. Only 
one participant diagnosed schizophrenia for the DID vignette; none reported DID for the 
schizophrenia vignette. 
One begins to speculate that there is a gap that has yet to be identified between the 
acquired knowledge about this group of mental health disorders and the actual 
operationa1ization of this knowledge in clinical areas. Perhaps this is related to the 
Skepticism, DID, Adolescents 74 
polymorphous symptom presentation inherent in DID (Lewis, 1996; Steinberg, 1996). It 
is possible that this unidentified gap could be a contributing factor to the lengthy period 
of time between mental health assessment when symptoms indicative ofDID are present 
in the patient and when the accurate diagnosis of DID is made by professionals (Putnam, 
et al., 1989). The gap between acquired knowledge about mental health disorders and 
operationalized knowledge in the clinical area becomes even more relevant when 
considering the fact that the schizophrenia vignette had less than 50% accuracy for 
diagnosis, with 17.6% of the participants diagnosing this vignette as a psychotic disorder. 
Berenson's (1998) belief that the trend in clinical training emphasizing strict adherence to 
the DSM-IV -TR criteria~ rather than amplifying diagnostic considerations through the 
exploration of development, the assessment of risk factors, and the description of family 
dynamics, contributes to missed diagnoses for adolescents, and this warrants further 
consideration to resolve diagnostic dilemmas. 
Certainly, the diagnostic results for the DID vignette denote the fact that although 
the diagnostic criteria and nomenclature for DID have been changed since it was first 
included in the DSM III as a separate diagnostic entity in 1980, these changes have not 
enabled practitioners to diagnose the disorder more accurately when given clinical data 
that experts in DID concur is indicative of the DID diagnosis. These results support Dell 
(2001) and Peterson's (1999) ongoing, although unsuccessful, advocacy for revisions in 
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DSM criterion that will enable clinicians to have access to a set of criteria more specific 
to DID, especially for children and adolescents. Perhaps other revisions in the learning 
materials (handouts, videotapes) used in seminars and conferences are also needed to 
portray the differences in dissociative diagnoses more accurately when features of 
dissociative pathology are being presented. 
Skepticism and Knowledge Scales. These survey results indicated a lack of 
skepticism about DID as well as a presence of knowledge about DID. However, a 
Skepticism Scale item demonstrated an obvious, almost equivalent, divisiveness in 
responses related to the existence of DID as a clinical phenomenon, which is being 
demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt. Reminiscent of Ellenberger's (1970) 
extensive historical review of the two-hundred years old debates related to dissociative 
pathology, some respondents (38.2%) strongly disagreed/disagreed that the existence of 
DID was beyond any reasonable doubt; other respondents (38.3%) strongly 
agreed! agreed. 
This divisiveness leads one to speculate about the data necessary for a more 
cohesive view of this belief within the field ofpsychology. This.1 % difference could 
exemplify the influence on psychologists of the contemporary scientific discourse, in the 
trauma literature, between advocates ofDID (Kluft, 1997; van der Kolk, 1997) and 
skeptics of DID (Hyman & Loftus, 1997). Proponents ofDID and skeptics of DID each 
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accuse the other side of faulty research methodology as well as over generalized 
conclusions. This further confounds and complicates the issues relevant to trauma 
sequelae (Appelbaum, Uyhara, & Elin, 1997). 
The results of the Skepticism and Knowledge Scales present some puzzling 
information. For example, there was predominant agreement (79.5%), within this sample, 
that trauma in childhood contributes to developing DID and that the onset ofDID is 
invariably in childhood (47%). This finding is consistent with research reports in the 
dissociative literature that DID develops prior to six years of age (Kluft, 1984; Peterson, 
1996; Putnam, 1997; Ross, 1997), and with developmental experts' findings (Macfie, 
Cicchetti, & Toth, 2001) that physically and sexually abused pre-school children 
demonstrate more dissociation than nonmaltreated children, following different 
dissociative trakctories. 
The majority of respondents' (58.9%) belief that DID can be created in 
counseling/psychotherapy is consistent with the views of skeptics of DID (Lief, 1994; 
Loftus, 1993; Hyman & Loftus, 1997; Spanos, 1994). Skeptics of DID have concluded 
that false memories of abuse, and DID, can be iatrogenically created by therapists. 
Skeptics of DID believe that therapists who suggest therapeutic activities to patients such 
as hypnosis, sodium amytal, imagery techniques, joumaling, and reviewing old family 
photographs can lead the patient to construct memories of events that never occurred 
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(Hyman & Loftus, 1997). Such bewildering information not only creates double binds, 
but also raises questions for the psychology practitioner. 
The double bind exists if the psychologist leans towards the trauma-based model, 
diagnosing DID; the possibility then exists that the psychology practitioner may be 
accused legally and professionally of iatrogenically creating the disorder via therapeutic 
suggestions. On the other hand, if one leans towards the sociocognitive model, not 
diagnosing DID when it is present, then the possibility exists that the psychology 
practitioner can be held legally responsible for misdiagnosing a disorder that has been 
established as trauma-based and is cited in the DSM. Congruent with the results of this 
study, one can only speculate that DID would not be the primary diagnosis considered 
even when the clinically presented material meets DSM criteria for DID. Perhaps the 
61.8% of participants who disagreed with the idea that they would not diagnose someone 
as having DID suggests that DSM criteria needs to reflect more accurately the clinical 
presentation ofthis 'patient population to avoid misdiagnosis. 
The following question arises: if the onset of DID occurs in childhood, prior to six 
years of age, why are so few patients with DID not diagnosed as having DID until they 
are twenty or thirty years of age (Horevitz & Braun, 1986; Kluft, 1985; Putnam, et aI., 
1986)? If it is true that DID can be created in counseling/psychotherapy, is it not possible 
to dissimulate evidence of DID in counseling/psychotherapy? A large percentage (58.8%) 
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agreed that DID is extremely rare. Is it possible that it is rare because it is seldom 
diagnosed accurately, as the results of this and other studies indicate? One could wonder 
if there is truth in the proverb that one cannot diagnose what one does not know exists (or 
considers to be rare). Yet in this sample, 79.4% strongly disagreed/disagreed that DID 
does not exist. 
The following Knowledge Scale items are indicative of the knowledge about DID 
that have possibly been acquired at the numerous seminars/conferences attended by these 
participants. These items further support the view that there is a gap between acquired 
knowledge and operationalizing the acquired knowledge in clinical areas. The majority of 
participants (72.5%) demonstrated knowledge that DID is not an Axis II disorder. Most 
respondents (85.3%) indicated being knowledgeable about the findings that DID has been 
diagnosed more frequently in females than in males (APA, 2000). The current gender 
ratio (9: 1) for DID, based on adult populations, may shift in the future as findings in 
small samples for gender ratio's in children and in adolescents diagnosed with DID have 
been found to be closer to 1:1 (Waterbury, 1991). 
Other participants (64.7%) recognized that PTSD is not classified as a 
dissociative disorder in the DSM, despite the overlapping symptomotology between 
PTSD and OlD. Given this knowledge base about DSM classifications, it is curious that 
11.7% of participants did diagnose the DID vignette as PTSD, which is classified as an 
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anxiety disorder. A review of the overlapping symptomotology ofPTSD and DID 
succinctly described in N emzer' s (1996) behaviorally based guide to differential 
diagnosis could give more clarity to distinguishing between PTSD and DID in clinical 
practice. Adult DID patients have reported PTSD as a diagnosis preceding the diagnosis 
of DID, supporting Berenson's (1998) belief that "one disorder may be an early 
manifestation of another disorder or that one disorder may be part ofanother (p. 918)" as 
many DID patients also meet criteria for PTSD. Nevertheless, dissociative experts 
(Putnam, 1997; Ross, 1997) recommend that the DID diagnosis is super ordinate to the 
PTSD diagnosis when patients meet criteria for both, as clinically the DID diagnosis 
subsumes the PTSD symptomotology. 
The majority of participants' (58.8%) agreement that more funding should be 
devoted to research on DID might also consider allocating a portion of these funds to an 
empirical study of how psychologists operationalize acquired knowledge about DID in 
clinical practice. Ross (1989) notes that graduate training about DID is rarely mentioned 
and trainees are often told that DID is over diagnosed and rarely encountered. 
Nevertheless, 50% of participants in this study recognized that the number of 
documented DID cases has increased over the past two decades. Proponents ofDID 
(Ross, 1997), attribute the increase in diagnosed cases to recently developed dissociative 
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testing procedures and diagnostic skills. However, skeptics of DID (Lief, 1994) attribute 
the recent increase in reported cases of DID to the iatrogenic nature of DID. 
Lief(1994), a member of the False Memory Syndrome Advisory Board, reported 
that in more than fifty years as a practicing psychiatrist, he has never encountered a case 
of DID. Apparently beliefs about the rarity of DID, rather than knowledge about DID, 
may have influenced the participants' selection of a diagnosis, albeit inaccurate, for the 
DID vignette. To extrapolate from Nav~iits' (1997) work, practitioners base their therapy 
on theoretical models created from beliefs and private assumptions. 
Whether one espouses trauma-based beliefs or sociocognitive beliefs, the truth is 
that both are fallible. It is possible that the inaccurate diagnoses for the DID vignette were 
based more on private assumptions than on knowledge acquired. The acrimonious nature 
of the debate between proponents of DID and skeptics of DID leads one to contemplate 
Ross' (1997) belief that between proponents of DID and skeptics of DID is an "ideology 
and bias, not because of data or science ... but because of the link between DID and 
childhood physical and sexual abuse (pp, 70, 80)." Perhaps this reflects Rivera's (1996) 
belief that there is a societal denial about the physical and sexual harm done to children 
by parents, and that the harm done in childhood can have traumatic sequelae. 
A m~iority (64.7%) of participants strongly disagreed/disagreed that all of the 
symptoms related to DID can be explained by and accurately diagnosed as another 
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psychological factor. Paradoxically, 70.7% ofthe sample did, indeed, diagnose the DID 
vignette as another psychological diagnosis. This lends credibility to other researchers' 
(Hornstein; 1996; Putnam, 1997; Steinberg, 1996) findings that the complex symptom 
presentation of DID requires clinicians to develop a framework to organize the complex 
symptom presentation and to request diagnostic consultation with DID experts. 
The large percentage (82.4%) of participants who strongly disagreed/disagreed 
that DID is largely an excuse used to avoid responsibility for personal actions was a 
surprise. Conversely, 52.9% of participants reported that people can fake DID 
successfully. This suggests that another paradoxical belief set exists within this sample. 
Assuming a factitious posture of DID suggests that there is a benefit to faking 
DID. Usually the benefit of faking a factitious pathway in any mental disorder is to avoid 
legal responsibility for one's actions as in the highly sensationalized case of Kenneth 
Bianchi, the Hillside Strangler (Watkins, 1984). Media presentations of DID often 
illustrate a dramatic, over sensationalized individual accused of heinous crimes, such as 
the main character in the recent movie, Primal Fear. The characters portrayed in films 
and soap operas depict alternate self-states who assume executive control ofthe 
individual and often, in the film, do escape responsibility for their illegal actions by 
feigning DID. 
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Lewis' et al. (1996) extensive research findings about the objective 
documentation of 12 convicted murderers who have DID refutes the media portrayals of 
DID. These researchers' findings were that all 12 murderers met the criteria for DID, but 
that not one of the 12 had used the diagnosis of DID as part of their legal defense. 
However, other researchers' (Spanos, Weekes, Menary, & Bertrand, 1986) findings 
suggest that features of DID can be simulated because college students were able to role-
play successfully features of DID. Ross (1997) has countered the findings about 
simulating DID, although admitting that college students can easily role-play features of 
DID. He notes that the participants did not have specific primary and secondary features 
of DID and did not role-play anything approaching the full clinical picture of DID. 
Spiegel (1993) summarizes the historical and contemporary waxing and waning 
of professional beliefs about DID that led to this study: 
The phenomena of dissociation have themselves been dissociated from 
the mainstream of psychiatry and psychiatric theory despite origins at 
the heart of early psychiatric and psychological thougnt. William 
James, Morton Prince, Joseph Breur, Sigmund Freud, and Pierre Janet 
based their diverse but influential theories ofpsychological functioning 
in large measure on their observations of dissociation and its effects. 
Despite this history, the phenomenon has been viewed as something of 
an oddity in psychiatry, causing many to doubt the validity of the 
disorders (p. ix). 
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Conclusions 
Exploratory determinations. Unlike research findings on professional skepticism 
and knowledge about DID found in the adult literature, participants demonstrated a lack 
of skepticism about DID and were knowledgeable about DID. Nevertheless, the high 
percentage of false negative diagnoses for the DID vignette suggested a gap between the 
knowledge acquired about DID and application of the knowledge acquired to make an 
accurate diagnosis of DID. Because ofthe limitations of this study, the findings for this 
research can be considered only as exploratory rather then conclusive. Perhaps the real 
conclusions for this study lie in the data that has not been obtained because of the 
potential participants' reluctance to respond. It is possible that the data from those who 
chose not to participate could emulate the findings on professional skepticism about DID 
found in the adult literature reflecting not only extreme skepticism about DID, but also a 
lack of knowledge about DID 
Tracking Woozles. In Milne's (1994) work, "The Complete Tales ofWirinie-the­
Pooh," Milne describes the experience ofPooh Bear tracking Woozles in the forest; that 
is a metaphor applicable to the conclusions for this study. In the story, Piglet spots Pooh 
walking in the forest and joins him, learning that Pooh is following tracks that he believes 
were made by a Woozle. As Pooh and Piglet continue walking in circles following the 
tracks, Piglet becomes frightened believing that perhaps there is more then one Woozle 
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and that they may be tracking Wizzles. He thinks about ways that he might leave Pooh to 
track alone, so that he might be "Out of All Danger Again" (p.40). When their friend, 
Christopher Robin, whistles from a tree branch, Piglet uses the opportunity to leave Pooh 
with Christopher, and he to run home. 
Christopher points out to the little bear that he, Pooh, went round the spinney 
himself and then was joined by Piglet and they went round the spinney together. Pooh 
paused to think "in the most thoughtful way that he could think" (p.4I) and becomes 
aware that the tracks were his own and Piglet's, not the Woozles. Meanwhile, Piglet who 
has left the scene, relieved to be out of danger, does not learn that the tracks were made, 
not by Woozles, but by himself and Pooh. 
Pooh represents participants in this study, and Piglet represents those who chose 
not to respond. Christopher Robin represents the existing body ofknowledge related to 
DID found in the literature. Similar to the story line, both participants and non 
participants in this study have followed the tracks laid down by the proponents of DID 
and the skeptics of DID in the literature on dissociative pathology. Participants had to 
think about dissociative pathology, much like Pooh, in a most thoughtful way in 
responding to the survey. Non-participants, similar to Piglet, chose not to respond to the 
survey, perhaps believing that DID is not acredible diagnosis, missing, however, an 
opportunity to contribute valuable information about their beliefs to the field of 
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psychology. Perhaps, like Piglet, non·participants had an initial curiosity about the survey 
and began to feel threatened, believing themselves to be in professional danger should 
they respond to a survey on such a controversial diagnosis via the Internet. Such a belief 
is understandable, at a more personal level, as one considers that acknowledging DID 
implicitly acknowledges that childhood physical and sexual abuse exists, and that the 
abuse can have an enduring pattern of pathological sequelae, DID. The lack ofdefinitive 
conclusions for this study points to the idea that the diagnostic tracks about DID laid 
down by clinicians diagnosing DID in adults have not been followed by clinicians who 
diagnose children and adolescents. Psychologists who diagnose children and adolescents 
&eern tp brF~ve ~he tracks are Woozles rather than diagnostic criteria for DID, suggesting 
the existence of professional skepticism about DID, as well as the lack of knowledge 
about DID that researchers (Dell, 1988; Hayes & Mitchell, 1994) have found among 
therapists treating adult populations. 
The limitations of this study, particularly the low response rate, lend some 
credence to Putnam's (1997) awareness that the field of dissociative pathology in 
childhood lags behind the dissociative pathology field related to adults. Psychologists 
diagnosing children and adolescents may continue tracking Woozles rather than thinking, 
similar to Pooh, in a most thoughtful way about the centuries·old literature and research 
fmdings about DID that is currently available to them. 
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Limitations ofthe Study 
The primary limitation of this study was the extremely low response rate of2.7% 
that allows only for a descriptive statistical analysis and reduced power in calculating 
correlations between variables. The low response rate and the low internal consistency of 
the Knowledge Scale hindered external validity. Generalizeability was prohibited also by 
the nature of the topic and the selected category of DID in children and adolescents. A 
final limitation was that the Skepticism and Knowledge Scales designed by Hayes and 
Mitchell (1994) had not been formerly used on a population of therapists treating children 
and adolescents because their study investigated the skepticism and knowledge of 
therapists about DID in adults. 
Future Research Directions 
Improving response rate. The abysmal response rate from potential participants 
for this study indicates a reluctance among psychologists to respond to topics relevant to 
diagnosing DID in children and in adolescents that is reminiscent ofK1uft's (1990) 
findings that scientific committees are reluctant to present topics relevant to diagnosing 
DID. Future researchers might circumvent this issue by utilizing a pool of participants 
friendly to the researchers, as Hayes and Mitchell (1994) did in their research on 
professional skepticism about DID. For example, obtaining support for replicating this 
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research from administrators of agencies specializing in diagnosing and treating children 
could increase accountability for therapists to respond to the survey. 
Replicating this study via more traditional research methods such as postal mail 
surveys could also expand the response rate. The recent explosion of SP AM on the 
Internet, potential participants changing online communication services, changes in e­
mail addresses, and the plethora of browsers have been obstacles to conducting research 
via the Internet. 
Skepticism about DID. The research findings about a positive correlation between 
trauma and dissociation involving children from preschool through late adolescence 
provides fertile ground for researching skepticism about DID. These findings indicate 
that maltreated children do not follow the normative dissociation trajectory found in cross 
sectional developmental studies: the older the child, the less dissociation (Macfie, et aI., 
2001). Future research could combine developmental researchers' expertise with trauma 
researches' expertise to determine the beliefs and the knowledge held by the clinicians 
about abnormal dissociative trajectories found in maltreated children. The results of this 
research could be useful in ascertaining why DID is seldom diagnosed in childhood. 
Knowledge about DID. Dissociative experts (Ross, 1989; Silberg, 1998) concur 
that graduate programs seldom include training in dissociative pathology, or training in 
the use ofpsychological testing to ascertain dissociative pathology. Future research 
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focusing on the information' necessary for inclusion in graduate programs relevant to 
assessing and treating dissociative pathology is required to determine how knowledge 
about DID is obtained, or not obtained. Another avenue for research is to survey graduate 
students about the knowledge obtained in their respective graduate programs when 
assessing maltreated children and adolescents for dissociative pathology. The findings 
from these proposed studies may lend support to the belief that one can not diagnose 
what one does not know exists. 
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Appendix A 
e-mail Invitation to Psychologists to Participate in Study 
From: Nemadden@aol.com. 
Subject: Doctoral Candidate Seeking Candidates for Research Study - Not SPAM 
My name is Nancy Madden and I am a doctoral candidate in clinical psychology 
at Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine. If you have already responded to my 
survey, thank you and please disregard this e-mail. If you have not responded to my 
survey, please consider doing so as your input is important to the research outcome. Your 
participation should take approximately 20 minutes of your valuable time. 
I obtained your e-mail address from the APA Membership Registry for the years 
of 2000 or 2003. I am conducting an empirical research study on psychologists' beliefs 
and knowledge about diagnosing adolescents. Your participation in this research study is 
appreciated in order to have the data compiled from professionals who are knowledgeable 
and interested in diagnosing adolescents. Empirical research such as this is needed in the 
field of psychology to facilitate the developments of psychology as a profession and to 
assist in educating the public that the practice of psychology involves more than "just 
talking to someone." Practitioners ofpsychology consistently test and retest hypotheses 
in an effort to substantiate the utility of their knowledge base. 
The deadline for responding to the survey is June 1, 2003. Should you choose to 
participate in this study, the results will be available to you on the Web site after June30, 
2003. 
QUESTIONS? SEND ME AN E-MAIL 
PROCEED TO INFORMED CONSENT 
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AppendixB 
Website Introduction 
Welcome to the website designed to study psychologists' beliefs and knowledge 
about diagnosing adolescents. As you proceed through this site, there will be an informed 
consent form designed and authorized by the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic 
Medicine describing specific informed consent details such as voluntary participation and 
maintaining your confidentiality. The informed consent is followed by the survey 
instrument which includes questions to collect demographic data. Participation should 
take approximately 20 minutes of your time. Because research based data is vital to the 
clinical practice of psychology, your responses as an expert in the area of diagnosing 
adolescents are of particular value. 
In return for your participation in this study, I would like to share the results of 
this research with you. Once you have accepted the Informed Consent and completed the 
survey, you will be instructed as to how to access the summary results of this research. A 
summary is expected to be available by June 30, 2003. 
To continue, please click below to proceed to the informed consent area of this 
website. 
PROCEED TO INFORMED CONSENT 
QUESTIONS? SEND ME AN E-MAIL 
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Appendix C 
 
Infonned Consent Fonn 
 
PHI L11 D t I. PHI A ' COL I. P,t'; E . O)l . OS TEO PAT HIe • M 1-: Die I N E 




TITLE OF STUDY 
Psychologists' Beliefs and Knowledge about Diagnosing Adolescents 
PLTRPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the nature ofpsychologists' beliefs and 
knowledge about diagnosis in adolescents. 
You are being asked to be in this research study because you are listed as a member 
ofthe Society of Clinical and Adolescent Psychology in the American Psychological 
Association membership register. Hence, it is presumed that you are knowledgeable 
about diagnosing adolescents and have an interest in empirical research studies. If 




Name: Robert A DiTomasso, Ph.D., ABPP 
 
Department of Psychology at PCOM 
 
Address: 4190 City Ave. 
 
Philadelphia, P A 1913 8 
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Phone: 215-871-6511 
Responsible Investigator: 
Name: Nancy E. Madden, RN, MS, CS 
Department: Doctoral Candidate in Psychology 
Address: 454 Germantown Pike 
Lafayette Hill, P A 19444 
Phone: 610-828-0608 or e-mail Nemadden@aol.com 
The doctors and scientists at Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine (PCOM) 
do research on diseases and new treatments. The survey you are being asked to 
volunteer for is part of a research project for doctoral dissertation requirements. 
If you have any questions about this research, you can call Dr. DiTomasso at (215) 
871-6511. 
If you have any questions or problems during the study, you can ask Dr. DiTomasso, 
who will be available during the entire study. If you want to know more about Dr. 
DiTomasso's background, or the rights of research subjects, you can call Dr. John 
Simelaro, Chairperson, and PCOM Institutional Review Board at (215) 871-6337. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCEDURES 
This survey will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. This study involves 
providing a primary diagnosis for two vignettes, completing a belief and knowledge 
survey about diagnosis, and providing demographic information. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS 
While there is no direct benefit to individual participants, the results will potentially 
lead to a better understanding of the diagnosis ofmental illness in adolescents and 
contribute empirical data about diagnosing adolescents to the field of psychology. 
Thus, current and future psychologists may benefit from what the researchers learn 
from this study. 
RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
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It is not reasonable to identify all potential risks in any research, but all reasonable 
safeguards have been taken to minimize the potential risk of damage to your 
professional reputation should your diagnoses be incorrect. The results of this data 
will be coded in such a way that your identity will not be physically attached to the 
final data as any IP headers and/or e-mail addresses will be deleted prior to removing 
the data from the computer files for statistical analysis. 
ALTERNATIVES 
You may choose not to participate in this survey study. 
PAYMENT 
You will not receive any payment for being in this study. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information relating to your participation will be kept in a computer file 
accessible only via password and identification number to the researchers. Only the 
members ofthe Institutional Review Board will be able to look at these records. 
Your name or any identifying infonnation will not be associated in any way with any 
published results or reports to scientific groups. 
NEW FINDINGS 
If any new infonnation develops that may affect your willingness to stay in this 
study, you will be told about it. 
INJURY 
You should contact John Simelaro, D.O., Chairperson, PCOM Institutional Review 
Board at (215) 871-6337 if you think that you have not been told enough about the 
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You may refuse to be in this study. You voluntarily consent to be in this study with 
the understanding of the known possible effects or hazards that might occur while 
you are in this study. Not all the possible effects of the study are known. 
You may leave this study at any time by selecting on of the following: clicking the 
on-screen button that says "I Do Not Agree," exiting the study site, surfing elsewhere, 
not clicking the on-screen button that says "Submit Survey." 
You also understand that if you drop out of this study, there will be no penalty or loss 
of benefits to which you are entitled. 
I have had adequate time to read this form and I understand its contents. I can print a 
personal records. copy of this form for my 
I agree to be in this research study and understand that my informed consent is 
obtained when I click the on-screen button that says "I Agree" since my signature 
cannot be obtained via Internet. 




Q. Do you agree? o I Agree o I Do Not Agree 
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Appendix D 
Case Vignettes of DID and Schizophrenia 
Please read the vignettes and based on the information provided, assign a primary 
diagnosis for each. Once completed, please click on the 'Next' button at the 
bottom of the page. Please do not attempt to use the 'Back' button to return to this 
page as this research study is designed to collect the diagnosis of each vignette 
prior to answering the multiple choice and demographic questions. 
'VigneHe 1. 
Susan is a 17 year-old female who is enrolled full time in the 11 th grade at Public 
High School. This is the first time that she has sought services from a mental 
health professional. She complains of "lost periods of time." Recently, there have 
been hours, and even days, that she does not recall. Susan remembers some 
occurrences of being sexually abused as a child, but many ofher childhood 
memories are gone. She reports that her peers have talked to her about sudden 
mood changes and have expressed concern about her. She admits to "not feeling 
like herself' sometimes but cannot explain just how. Susan thinks that she is close 
to failing school because of these episodes. Most distressing of all to her are 
voices that she hears talking to her from inside her head. She does admit to an 
increase of stress at school, accompanied by bouts of lethargy. 
Primary Diagnosis: 1__________1 
Vignette2. 
Susan is a 17 year-old female who is enrolled full time in the 11 th grade at Public High 
School. This is the first time that she has sought services from a mental health 
professional. For more than half a year, she has been having intense "daydreams" that 
take up hours of her day, are perceived as real, and often feel controlling to Susan. These 
losses oftime have had a negative effect on her academic work. Her peers have talked to 
her about her shifting mood sequences and increasing introversion. They have expressed 
concern about her. Susan thinks that she is in danger of failing school because of her 
deteriorating academic performance and social functioning. Most distressing of all, 
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however, are voices that she hears talking to her, often originating from inanimate objects 
such as appliances. She does admit to an increase of stress at school, accompanied by 
bouts of lethargy. 
Primary Diagnosis: I
_ ~,, ______~___,_~._.__f 
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Appendix E 
Skepticism and Knowledge Scales 
This research is designed to not allow a return to the Vignette Section; however, in the 
following section you will be able to move back and forth as you respond to the 
following statements. 
Please indicate if you 'Strongly Disagree', 'Disagree', are 'Unsure', 'Agree', or 'Strongly 
Agree' with each of the following statements. (choose one for each statement) 
1. 

The existence ofDissociative Identity Disorder (DID), formerly Multiple Personality 









C Strongly Agree 
2. 

Major trauma is a ·contributing factor to the development of Depersonalization Disorder. 









 Strongly Agree 
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3. 

Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), is under-diagnosed. 













Dissociative Fugue, formerly called Psychogenic Fugue, is most often a fabrication used 

to avoid personal responsibility. 
















Schizophrenia does not exist. 











C Strongly Agree 
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6. 








0 Strongly Agree 
7. 

Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), is a misdiagnosis of schizophrenia. 






0 Strongly Agree 
8. 











0 Strongly Agree 
Skepticism, DID, Adolescents 120 
9. 
















More funding should be devoted to research on Dissociative Identity Disorder. 










0 Strongly Agree 
11. 
I would not diagnose someone as having Dissociative Fugue. 









 Strongly Agree 
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12. 

Depersonalization Disorder is over-diagnosed. 












 Strongly Agree 
13. 

The symptoms of Schizophrenia must be present for at least six months in order for this 

to be a viable diagnosis. 






C Strongly Agree 
14. 

The number of documented cases ofDissociative Identity Disorder (DID) has increased 

over the past two decades. 
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15. 

The existence of Dissociative Fugue as a clinical phenomenon has been demonstrated 

beyond any reasonable doubt. 













 Strongly Agree 
16. 

Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is an Axis II disorder in the DSM IV -TR. 













 Strongly Agree 
17. 

Schizophrenia is a misdiagnosis of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). 
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18. 

Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is largely an excuse used by people to avoid 











0 Strongly Agree 
19. 

I would not diagnose someone as having Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). 







 Strongly Agree 
20. 

PTSD is classified as a dissociative disorder in the DSM-IV TR. 













 Strongly Agree 
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21. 

Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) has been diagnosed more frequently in females than 

in males. 










 Strongly Agree 
22. 

Dissociative Fugue and Dissociative Amnesia, formerly called Psychogenic Amnesia, 

should be considered two forms of the same disorder instead of two separate disorders. 







0 Strongly Agree 
23. 

Schizophrenia is over-diagnosed. 









 Strongly Agree 
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24. 

Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is extremely rare. 












 Strongly Agree 
25. 

People can fake Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) successfully. 











 Strongly Agree 
26. 

Schizophrenia is often a result of an organic mental disease. 













 Strongly Agree 
27. 

The onset of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is almost invariably in childhood. 
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0 Strongly Agree 
28. 

All of the symptoms related to Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) can be explained by 

and accurately diagnosed as another psychological factor. 











 Strongly Agree 
29. 

People can fake schizophrenia successfully. 










0 Strongly Agree 
30. 

Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) does not exist. 
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0 Strongly Agree 
Finally, please tell us about yourself. 
Dl. 

What is your gender? (choose one) 

n n -. Female . Male 
D2. ­
What is your age? (choose one) 





20 - 29 

0 
 30 - 39 
0 40 - 49 

0 
 50 - 59 
() 
60 - 69 

0 
 70 and over 
D3. 

What is the highest level ofeducation you have completed? (choose one) 

















How many years have you been practicing in the field ofpsychology? (choose one) 

() 
1 - 9 years 
() 
10 - 19 years 
() 
20 - 29 years 

C 
 30 - 39 years 
0 40 - 49 years 

0 
 50 or more years 
D5. 

What is your race/ethnicity? (Optional; choose one) 





 Black or African American 
o Hispanic 
o Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
o White 
o Another race or multiracial 
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D6. 

How many seminars/conferences have you attended over the past five years in which you 

have learned about DID/MPD? 

Number of seminars/conferences: L____________j 
D7. 

What is your primary work setting? (choose one) 

o Private Practice 
o Hospital 
o University/college counseling center 
o Elementary, middle or high school setting 
o University/college academic position 










-------------~--~-------------- ---------~--~ ; 
Which best describes your job title? (choose one) 
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r Clinical Psychologist 
e- School Psychologist 




If you selected 'Other', please explain: 
 
D9. 
Please indicate the extent to which your theoretical orientation is composed of each of the 
following (please assign percentages that add up to 100%) 
Psychodynamic (e.g. Freudian, Sullivanian, ego psychology; self I j 
psychology, etc.) -------------- ­
Learning (e.g. Behavioral, Cognitive, CognitivelBehavioral, L~____~jSocial Learning, etc.) 
 
Humanistic (e.g. Rogerian, Existential, Gestalt, etc.) L____________J 
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DI0. 
What is the average number of children between the ages of 1 and 12 I 
that you assess in a year?, 
Dll. 
What is the average number of adolescents between the ages of 13 L~_u ___ _and 18 that you assess in a year? 
D12. 
 
Check off any of the following organizations of which you are a member: (please check 
 
all that apply) 
 




International Society for the Study of Dissociation 




Other (please specify) 
D12b. 
 




~ _~~_~~_~ ~_ ~ ________u __'_ , ____ 
Thank you for your participation in this survey. 
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Please press the 'Submit Survey' button 

at the bottom ofthe survey to send your responses 

and for accessing study results. 

